Perceptions of feminist organizations regarding the EU's role in the Turkish women's movement by Amur, Leyla Magdalena
  
 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS REGARDING THE EU’S ROLE 
IN THE TURKISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
LEYLA AMUR 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Turkish Studies 
 
 
Sabancı University  
January 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS REGARDING THE EU’S ROLE 
IN THE TURKISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
 
 
Meltem Müftüler-Baç       …………………. 
(Thesis Advisor) 
 
 
Fuat Keyman                    ……………………. 
 
 
 
Özge Kemalıoğlu    …………………… 
 
 
 
 
DATE OF APPROVAL:   January 5, 2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Leyla Amur 2015 
 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   iv	  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS REGARDING THE EU’S ROLE 
IN THE TURKISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
 
LEYLA AMUR 
Master’s Thesis, January 2015  
Supervisor: Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Keywords: Turkish women’s movement, feminist organizations, gender equality, 
Turkey and the EU 
The status of women’s rights in Turkey presents a dilemma with 2014 marking 100 
years of women in tertiary institutions and gains made in all aspects of life in the 
Turkish women’s movement while, on the other hand, Turkey has consistently low 
rankings on international indexes on gender equality alongside statements made by top-
level officials in the Turkish government questioning the very notion of gender equality. 
In this environment, the question of how feminist organizations, the major players in the 
Turkish women’s movement working on women’s issues, perceive the European Union 
(EU) in the movement becomes increasingly important. In approaching this problem by 
utilizing concepts related to sociological institutionalism and by conducting semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with activists from three feminist organizations 
(KA.DER, KAGIDER, and Mor Çatı), this thesis shows that they perceive the EU as a 
normative power and they themselves as dependent on the EU for the promulgation of 
women’s rights in the Turkish women’s movement. This thesis further takes into 
consideration external factors such as major developments in relations between Turkey 
and the EU throughout the years as well as an emerging narrative in public discourse 
that has shaped the environment in which feminist organizations operate in. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
FEMINIST ÖRGÜTLERIN AB'NIN TÜRK KADIN HAREKETLERI ROLÜNE 
İLIŞKIN BAKIŞ AÇILARI 
 
 
LEYLA AMUR 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2015 
 
Danışman: Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: Türkiye’de kadın hareketi, feminist örgütleri, cinsiyet eşitliği, 
Türkiye ve AB 
 
Türkiye uluslararası endeksler üzerinde sürekli düşük sıralamalar da yer almakta ve 
Türkiye'deki üst düzey yöneticiler de cinsiyet eşitliği kavramını sorgulayan demeçler 
vermekte iken, Türkiye'de kadın hakları 100. yılını doldurduğu 2014 itibari ile 
kadınların üçüncül örgütler ve hayatın tüm yönlerin de elde ettikleri kazançlar 
bakımından bir ikilem oluşturmaktadır. Böyle bir ortamda, feminist örgütlerin ve Türk 
kadın hakları üzerinde çalışan ana aktörlerin Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) hareket 
içerisindeki yerine dair nasıl bir bakış açısına sahip olduğu sorusu önem teşkil 
etmektedir. Bu soruna yaklaşırken, yarı - yapılandırma tekniği ile ve sosyolojik 
kurumsallaşma kavramlarını kullanarak, derinlemesine üç farklı feminist örgüt aktivisti 
(KA.DER, KAGIDER ve Mor Çatı) ile bağlantılı mülakatlar ile, bu tez AB'nin bir 
normatif güç olarak ele alındığını ve Türk kadın hakları hareketinin yayılımı 
bakımından AB'ye bağımlı olduklarının kanaatine varmıştır. Bu tez, ayrıca, Türkiye-AB 
ilişkilerinin yıllara göre ilerleyişi ve feminist örgütlerin faaliyet gösterdiği ortamı 
şekillerinden toplumsal söylemin gelişmekte olan tahkiyesi gibi dış faktörleri de dikkate 
almaktadır.  
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At the First International Summit on Women and Justice in Istanbul in 
November 2014, Turkish President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan stated that he does not 
consider men and women to be equal due to the Islamic perception of creation (fitrat). 
Erdoğan then reinforced his earlier statement a couple days later at a meeting with the 
pro-Muslim Independent Industrialists and Businessman’s Association (MUSİAD) 
when he stated, “You cannot put men and women on equal footing. What women need 
is to be treated at equal value with men rather than seeking equality”  (Daloğlu 2014). 
Along the same lines, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu implied that the more gender 
equality in Scandinavian countries is associated with a higher rate of suicide (“Gender 
Equality Triggers Suicide” Hürriyet Daily News). The aforementioned statements made 
by top-level officials have undoubtedly reignited a series of controversies and debates in 
the self-proclaimed secular Republic of Turkey. While this is not the first time in which 
officials have made statements regarding gender equality,1 this recent set of statements 
does call into question and requires a reconceptualization of how women are perceived 
in society. 
The year 2014 also marks the centennial of women in tertiary institutions in 
Turkey, however the status of women is still far from favorable. Reports released at the 
time this thesis was written such as the Gender Gap Index 2014 ranked Turkey 125 out 
of 140 countries (World Economic Forum 2014) and human rights watch groups 
announced a record number of murders among women for the year 2014 (Kızılkoyun 
2014). Gender equality in Turkey is far from being realized with a low rating in both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In July 2010, at the Women and Justice Summit (Kadın ve Adalet Zirvesi) Erdoğan made a similar  
statement claiming that men and women cannot be equal simply because their natures are not equal.  
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spheres of economic and political participation. Furthermore, the numbers of murders 
due to “honor killings” committed against young women in rural areas of Turkey along 
with the numbers of women exposed to domestic violence are said to have increased 
exponentially in the last couple of years and are a cause for concern (Tremblay 2014). 
Taking all this into consideration, the future of women’s rights in Turkey will most 
certainly remain on the political agenda for years to come, especially considering the 
fact that views regarding the role of women in society is extremely polarized in Turkey. 
That said, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the women’s movement in Turkey 
has not greatly contributed to elevating the status of women in society. Even though the 
women’s movement in Turkey has made strident gains in several aspects of life, recent 
statements made by officials run counterintuitive to several fundamental concepts 
employed by feminist organizations, acting as major impediments for the movement. 
This thesis attempts to address this complexity in shedding light on the way in which 
feminist organizations currently perceive the EU to fit within the women’s movement in 
Turkey. 
In common discourse and among certain ideologies in Turkey, the aim of 
reaching gender equality has often been conceptualized within the larger process of 
democratization. Prominent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) founded and ran 
by women in Turkey who are the main advocates of achieving gender equality in society 
have also been viewed as part of this ongoing process. Going through this process of 
democratization has often meant Turkey’s political, economic, and social integration 
into the global community via becoming a full member of the European Union (EU) in 
adhering to a set of international liberal norms and values. While state actors can carry 
their own weight in the aim of reaching full democratization, as has been evidenced by 
adhering to the political conditionality imposed by the EU, civil society has also been a 
vital player in meeting the demands of this democratization process in the 21st century 
(Göymen 2008). Thus, logic follows that in pursuit of the goal of democratizing a 
country, women’s organizations in civil society are extremely significant in promoting 
the agenda to solve problems currently faced by women in the 21st century. The integral 
role of women’s organizations in the women’s movement is well-documented in 
Turkey, particularly since the 1980s in their ability to situate themselves in a blossoming 
civil society. 
Given the complexity of overcoming gendered problems in today’s increasingly 
complicated and globalized world, women’s issues need to be addressed on many fronts 
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– at the national, international, and local levels – meaning there are several actors who 
work to confront the women’s issues in society. While women’s organizations denote 
several different ideologies, this thesis will particularly focus on women’s rights-
oriented feminist organizations that operate on the principles of feminism. Women’s 
organizations in Turkey emerged in the struggle against existing gender equalities and 
have served many roles and functions in fighting against mentalities, antiquated laws 
and behaviors, and rhetoric from the top level of the government in order to further 
promote gender equality. These organizations are firstly important for service provision 
whose aim is to help women in order to meet basic needs. They also play a role in 
deconstructing widely-held beliefs such as the role of patriarchy deeply embedded in the 
fabric of society, thus challenging the status quo. They also strive to make structural 
changes to better represent women as truly being reflected as half the population. These 
organizations also carry the heavy load of identifying the problems women face by 
raising awareness, mobilizing people at all levels of society, swaying public opinion 
through education and influence in media, maintaining legal prowess in drafting new 
laws and advocating, among other activities. Inherent in all these roles is acting as 
spokesperson for those who might not have a strong voice in society or unable to 
envisage a society that views both genders as equals. Women’s organizations in general, 
and feminist organizations in particular, work to confront deficits in certain spheres of 
society, namely political participation, economic participation, education and social 
needs. These organizations require capacities such as the know-how, the staff, the 
expertise, and the funding in order to carry out these functions (Esim 1999: 890). 
Of course, it would also be disingenuous to suggest that Turkey is exceptional in 
having serious deficits in the realm of gender issues – even in countries that rate higher 
in international development or gender equality indexes than Turkey, women elsewhere 
face numerous problems including a wage gap, lack of political participation, domestic 
violence, among other inequalities (Hubbard 2014). Thus, international institutions are 
major actors in tackling gender inequality due to their scope, outreach, organizational 
capabilities, and funding opportunities. International actors also play a vital role in 
holding international conferences, setting standards for the definitions of concepts, and 
proposed legal reforms leading to gender equality. In fact, achieving gender equality 
through gender mainstreaming has been a priority identified by EU institutions. 
Furthermore, the EU has clearly stated its intentions regarding gender issues for 
potential EU member states during the accession process, including Turkey. 
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Additionally, international institutions such as the EU have become increasingly 
important over the years not only in addressing gender issues on the international level 
but also in interacting with the players at the state level as well as those in civil society. 
Due to this, it is increasingly important to be able to examine the supranational 
institutions, state level, and civil society in order to more clearly form a picture of the 
efficacy of programs that are intended to solve the aforementioned problems. In 
addressing problems of inequality, supranational institutions, in our case, the EU, 
diffuse norms and values through the accession process during which candidate 
countries adhere to criteria in order to become a member of the institution (Tocci et al. 
2008, Slobodchikoff 2010). Thus, these norms have been increasingly spread to NGOs, 
especially to feminist organizations in Turkey, thereby enacting change. 
Taking into account the role of international institutions and increased 
interaction between institutions such as the EU and civil society organizations in 
candidate countries such as Turkey, the main idea of this thesis is to explore how and 
why perceptions of feminist organizations regarding the EU have shifted regarding the 
EU’s role in the Turkish women’s movement. In answering these questions, I intend to 
go beyond simple approval or disapproval ratings of the EU but instead delve into 
whether the EU is perceived as an anchor, an ally or equal partner, a reference point, an 
equal partner or as an impediment to the women’s movement. To further this argument, 
I wish to understand if the process of ostensible Europeanization through EU 
membership reforms has affected the perception of women’s organizations in light of 
poor public opinion and rising anti-western sentiment among the public and top-level 
officials. Given the current political climate in Turkey and from my reading of the 
literature on the women’s movement in Turkey, I hypothesize that feminist 
organizations perceive the EU as a normative power and as being dependent on the EU 
and its institutions in the struggle to address women’s issues in promulgating the 
Turkish women’s movement. Furthermore, I hypothesize that this perception is caused 
by external factors namely politics surrounding the EU and Turkey as well as an 
alternate narrative surrounding the women’s movement. 
In an attempt to explain this perception, I hope to expand on the changes that 
have occurred within and among feminist organizations actively engaged in the 
women’s movement since the late 80s and early 90s as having developed alongside the 
EU. I propose that there has been dependency on the EU ideologically, functionally, and 
fiscally among the higher profile feminist organizations interviewed for the purposes of 
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this thesis. Furthermore, the emergence of conservative political Islam and the patterns 
of behavior exhibited by high-level politicians in Turkey have contributed to this shift in 
perception. It would be outside the scope of this thesis to look at all women’s 
organizations across the entire ideological spectrum (liberal feminist, Kurdish feminist, 
conservative, state-sponsored feminist, among others) actively involved in the third 
phase of the women’s movement in Turkey considering varying aims, capacities, and 
functions perceive an international institution such as the EU. 
In order to be able to answer my research question(s), I plan to use terms and 
concepts offered by sociological institutionalism that will allow me to understand norms 
and values through discourse and rhetoric that in turn have shaped perceptions of 
women’s organizations (Finnemore 1996, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, March and 
Olsen 2009). In this process of self-identification and thus perception, an organization or 
institutional is shaped by its external factors. It is the aim of this thesis to be able to 
identify actors within the sociological institutionalism theoretical framework in order to 
better classify the way in which we can better understand the environment women’s 
organizations find themselves in and thus how perceptions are shaped regarding the way 
women’s organizations are then motivated to conduct themselves and their activities. 
Because this research relies heavily on discourse and rhetoric, I will integrate 
interviews, press releases and declarations made by women’s organizations into this 
paper in order to be able to decipher their perceptions of the EU’s role in the women’s 
movement in Turkey. I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with three 
activists associated with the following three high-profile women’s rights-oriented, 
feminist organizations: KA.DER (Support and Training of Women Candidates) works 
to promote the political participation among women in Turkey; KAGIDER (Women 
Entrepreneur’s Association) works to promote women entrepreneurs mainly in the 
economic sphere; and Mor Çatı (Purple Roof) provides shelter and other services for 
those women who need help from domestic violence. These organizations were chosen 
not only because of the extent with which they had interaction with cooperation with the 
EU but also because they addressed different areas of interest in the women’s 
movement.  I will further use material from debates in the media and statements made 
by top-level officials in order to form an accurate picture of the landscape in Turkey 
regarding the current stance on women’s issues by delineating how the movers and 
shakers of the society are responding to these struggles. 
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The rationale undergirding this thesis is double-fold in being able to contribute to 
the literature in a meaningful way and to have practical implications for the EU in being 
involved in the women’s movement in Turkey in the future. Much emphasis in the 
literature on Turkey-EU relations is placed only on the public perception of the EU in 
Turkey. There is a deficit in the literature on the organizations’ perceptions of the EU, in 
particular how feminist organizations perceive the EU’s role in the Turkish women’s 
movement. This is an area that warrants further analysis and research considering the 
recent boom in not only civil society groups but also the advancement of women in 
Turkish society especially since the late 90’s. Furthermore, the increasing impact that 
civil society organizations (CSOs) can have on a democratizing movement such as the 
women’s movement, especially while acting as a conduit for the people who want to see 
change in society. However, the opposite can be observed in Turkey and among other 
neighboring countries with the rise of conservative values in both the political and social 
spheres – in Turkey’s case conservative Islamic values that have tended to relegate 
women as secondary citizens. These values contradict many international institutions’ 
commitments to gender equality A recent Pew poll has revealed anti-western sentiment 
in Turkey with 73% of the Turkish public disliking the US and 66% disliking the EU 
(“Turks do not favor…”, Hürriyet Daily News). This signals the continued shift in 
public opinion against the EU in recent years. Bearing this in mind, exploring this as an 
area of study has practical implications as to whether or not the EU should change its 
approach when devising projects or giving out funding in order to better fit the Turkish 
context. I hope that this thesis will be able to shed light on the level of cooperation 
expected from women’s organizations of EU involvement in the women’s movement in 
Turkey especially with regard to practicality – funding, institutionalization, capacity 
building including training of employees or providing extra manpower to deal with 
certain details of projects. 
In the sections that follow, the first chapter will expound upon the theoretical 
framework undergirding this piece of work in the tradition of sociological 
institutionalism. With the basic ideas in sociological institutionalism, I hope to not only 
explain the shift in perception among women’s organizations but also to be able to 
explain the external factors that have affected normative values which then in turn have 
had an impact on the identity and thus activists’ perceptions of the EU within women’s 
organizations. In order to be able to elucidate this, I will expand upon my methodology 
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of using rhetoric and discourse from interviews and debates to elucidate norms in public 
discourse to bring some answers to the forefront.  
The women’s movement in Turkey did not occur in a vacuum, therefore in 
gaining a more nuanced view outside the realm of common discourse, one must 
critically analyze the historical developments in a multifaceted way. In an increasingly 
globalized and complex world, a movement such as the women’s movement needs to be 
understood in the context of the social and political forces that have and continue to 
shape it. In this specific situation, the increased interaction between the women’s 
organizations and the channels made available to these organizations via EU 
institutions. The second chapter of this thesis traces the history of the women’s 
movement in Turkey by dividing Turkey’s women’s movements into three distinct 
phases: the Ottoman period, the early Republican period, and the post 1980s to present 
day. Turkey has had quite a long history on struggling against inadequacies in women’s 
rights. Women who were among the upper echelons of society during the Ottoman 
Empire began the fight for women’s rights by establishing space for women to be able 
to debate the issues of the day but also by publishing women’s magazines. Turkey 
began its experiment with democracy in the early 20th century with potential and hope 
for change. The work of these early movers and shakers acted as impetus legal changes 
including a change to polygamy laws and also allowing women the right to vote. While 
this furthered the cause of women’s rights in Turkey, it also was within the view that 
women were exalted only to the point that their freedom would act as a marker of how 
modernized/westernized Turkey was becoming. Although these early reforms allowed 
women to gain an elevated status in society, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the 
first political party in modern Turkey established by founding father Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, did not allow for civil society to bloom during their single-party era. Therefore, 
much public debate about the furthering of women’s rights in Turkey outside the realm 
of Marxism remained fossilized until the 1980s military intervention, which saw the rise 
of various factions of women who mobilized protests in reaction to decisions made by 
judges on court cases. 
After gaining a clear picture of the historiography of the women’s movement in 
Turkey, the second chapter of this thesis positions women’s rights-oriented 
organizations, in particular feminist organizations, within the women’s movement. The 
strength of women’s organizations in Turkey was seen and felt of course in the earlier 
days in the late 80s with mass public mobilization to fight violence against women as 
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well as during the reform frenzy of the early 2000s in which both the Civil Code and the 
Penal Code were revised. The culmination of women’s organizations could be seen this 
time in their ability to mobilize, reframe the narrative of the debate as well as shift 
public opinion. This reform frenzy can be seen as a vital part of Turkey wanting to start 
accession negotiation talks with the EU – and in order to do that, it needed to pass a 
series of reforms. 
The third chapter turns to the EU in explaining its history of conventions, 
declarations, and treaties in adopting gender equality as one of its fundamental tenets in 
its rhetoric regarding human rights. Throughout this history, we can understand that 
gender equality was mainly seen through the lens and justified as a developmental goal 
stressing the importance of eliminating discrimination through implementing quotas and 
banning practices in the workplace that tend to lead to discrimination. While the ideas 
inherent and implied by human rights are something the EU wants to maintain 
internally, it has also placed a huge effort in exporting its ideas to candidate member 
states through its political and legal conditionality, pre-accession funding that is 
available to CSOs. Outside the membership accession, possibilities exist for women’s 
organizations in civil society in Turkey to take advantage of EU institutions for their 
own development and in carrying out their activities. Thus by looking at both the 
limitations of feminist organizations in Turkey during the early 90s and the vacuum that 
was filled by its mechanisms, we can begin to more clearly understand the way in which 
the EU has influenced and contributed to the women’s movement. 
In order to be able to better change the external environment in which feminist 
organizations operate in to achieve their goals of elevating the status of women in 
society, the fourth chapters looks at two women’s issues and their public discourse. 
Domestic violence against women is the first topic as it is an issue, which has been 
contentiously debated in Turkey and is one of the issues that galvanized the women’s 
movement in the 1980s. Within the realm of domestic violence, I will examine the 
clashing of mentalities between the Turkish government and a feminist organization by 
looking at a government-sponsored program entitled ŞÖNİM. This chapter also explores 
abortion, which has more recently made it onto the political agenda, therefore onto the 
agenda of feminist organizations. This example will further prove that while abortion is 
controversial , the government has restricted access to abortions with little to no public 
consultation.  
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The fifth chapter examines the way in which activists in feminist organizations 
currently perceive the EU. The perceptions of feminist organizations in the type of role 
that the EU should play in the women’s movement in Turkey will be analyzed after 
conducting semi-structured, in-depth interviews by looking at how the EU is perceived 
as a reference point, the perceived contributions of the EU to both the women’s 
movements and further to feminist organizations, and their perception of the future of 
the EU. 
Finally, the conclusion provides answers to the original hypotheses proposed at 
the beginning of this thesis considering both the analyses from interviews conducted as 
well as the external environment that feminist organizations operate in. Furthermore, the 
conclusion will contain remarks about prospects for future study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
	  
	  
 
This thesis aims to both understand and explain the perception of feminist 
organizations toward the EU. I intend to accomplish this by utilizing concepts and terms 
from sociological institutionalism to explain the external political and social factors that 
have had an impact on the perceptions of activists in feminist organizations. This will 
serve as a useful tool in order to understand common perceptions among feminist 
organizations who are engaged with EU projects.  
The social sciences have revealed that traditional dichotomies such as “East” and 
“West” or “modern” and “traditional” have no longer proven useful in an increasingly 
transnational world. Traditional state actors are no longer the only actors engaged in 
dialogue and diplomacy in solving global or domestic issues. Multilevel governance 
such as that of the EU exemplifies the vital role played by civil society plays in 
decision- and policy-making as well as creating a sense of belonging, necessitating the 
need to take social aspects into account. Newer theoretical models and concepts, such as 
those found in sociological institutionalism (March and Olsen, Finnemore and Sikkink), 
need to be employed to examine convoluted and layered developments. I hope to 
employ this framework in order to reveal the nuances in the way that the EU operates 
when it comes to its accession process for to potential member states and the process of 
norm diffusion. I will use certain concepts from the perspective of sociological 
institutionalism to be able to explain how the external environment have shaped 
organizations’ interests and activities by analyzing the perspectives of individual actors 
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that speak on behalf of the organizations. The mechanisms that the EU uses to spread its 
norms such as conditionality do not automatically ensure that these laws will be 
interpreted and implemented in the exact way stipulated by the EU. This interpretation 
of norms and values by state actors shape the environment and shape the way in which 
feminist organizations perceive the EU. 
In our case, we look to the interaction between CSOs that have taken root in a 
perceived larger democratization process in Turkey and specifically within the Turkish 
women’s movement. The women’s movement has always been at the whim of domestic 
political contestations that have not always offered an inviting environment for the 
promotion of feminist ideas due to the strong nation state and its brand of “state 
feminism” as well as conservatism – both of which have their own forms of patriarchy. 
The initial vacuum offered by the 1982 military coup in Turkey allowed for the 
burgeoning of feminist organizations leading them to rely on international institutions – 
namely the EU. This is illustrative of the idea that many feminist organizations have 
fallen into a conceptual trap in which they can’t conceive of the future of the women’s 
movement without aid from the EU. 
In arguing this throughout my thesis, In the following chapter, I plan to elucidate the 
role of norms in sociological institutionalism and the role that perceptions play among 
actors in determining appropriate behavior, thus leading actors and organizations to 
make decisions according to rules. These perceptions are then shaped by external 
contexts that these actors find themselves in. By being able to delve into the extent that 
these norms have or have not been internalized by external actors, we can begin to 
understand more analytically the way in which perceptions are formed. 
	  
1.1 Institutionalism 
	  
Within the past 50 years, the concept of institutionalism has gradually evolved to 
more holistically explain the forces that shape complex political processes and 
behaviors by gradually incorporating arguments that emphasize different aspects of 
institutionalism. In the realm of new institutionalism, Hall and Taylor identified three 
types of institutionalism: historical, sociological, and rational choice. Not only do their 
assumptions differ on what causes actors to behave in the way that they do but they also 
differ in the levels that are analyzed. Sociological institutionalists tend to look at how 
people are influenced at the supra-societal and supra-state level or at the level or 
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organizations, making it the most fitting theoretical framework for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
If we are to take March and Olsen’s definition of institutions that say an institution 
is a 
 
relatively stable collection of rules and practices embedded in structures of 
resources that make action possible – organizational, financial and staff 
capabilities, and the structures of meaning that explain and justify behavior – 
roles, identities, and belongings, common purposes, and causal and normative 
beliefs (2009: 5) 
 
In other words, institutions have their own resources, meaning they are in the 
position to oversee the way in which these resources such as know-how, organizational 
capacity, and funding are allocated. Thus, inherently institutions who already have the 
power to set the agenda but also in allocating resources that they have significant sway 
over how the actors perceive the environment around them and further how these actors 
act.  It is within this institutional context that social norms such as gender equality are 
shaped and shared. The increased social interactions between actors enable the diffusion 
of these norms, promoting a sense of common identity. 
1.1.2 Sociological Institutionalism 
	  
While three different types of institutionalism have been identified, this thesis 
focuses solely on sociological institutionalism in an attempt to understand the shift in 
perception of feminist organizations regarding the EU’s role. Sociological 
institutionalism began to take shape as a deficit existed in the literature regarding how 
“social realities influence behavior” in political life (Finnemore 1996: 325). In this way 
when sociological institutionalists refer to institutions, they are “emphasizing the social 
and cognitive features of institutions rather than structural and constraining features” 
(Finnemore 1996: 326). During the 70s, the common line of thought followed that 
culture had little to no impact on bureaucracies and organizations. This was contested by 
the sociological institutionalism, and their contribution to this institutionalist theory is 
tied to the role of institutions in promoting norms and their diffusion across societies. 
While an influential paper written by John W. Meyer at Stanford University 
during the same decade challenged this assumption, leading the way that the external 
environment was in fact important in shaping bureaucracies (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
This provided the foundation for the role of social norms and values to account for 
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behavior and action taken in the political sphere. Unsurprisingly, sociological 
institutionalism has its roots in organizational theory in providing an alternative “for the 
rational basis of ‘modern’ institutional forms and procedures” (Mackey 2009: 255). 
Indeed as Mackey so clearly stated, “institutional forms must therefore be analyzed not 
in terms of their rationality and efficiency but in terms of the culturally specific ways 
that they take on particular forms” (2009: 255). In other words, the when an actor makes 
a decision, it might not have been made in order to increase efficiency or to increase 
output as a rational choice model would suggest. Furthermore, the focus shifts to causes 
that are more cultural or ideational (Amenta 2010: 2) which leads us to the idea of 
norms. Norms are important as they are “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors 
within a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). 
While employing sociological institutionalism, it is vital to understand the 
connection between the political and the social, which in our case will be vital in 
explaining the attitudes and perceptions among activists in feminist organizations. In 
this way, the interaction between actors and institutions needs to be examined. 
Sociological institutionalism assumes that values and norms are embedded in 
institutional practices that we would otherwise take for granted. It is important to 
remember that these norms are also embedded in wider cultural contexts which could 
work both on the domestic and international level but for the purposes of this thesis we 
will look at how namely norm receptiveness at the domestic level helps to shape this 
context for feminist organizations. 
 
1.2 Logic of Appropriateness 
	  
Sociological institutionalism signals a cognitive shift from actors behaving and 
making decisions using a calculus-based approach to following the rules. March and 
Olsen first coined the term “logic of appropriateness,” denoting that actions are dictated 
by rules and these rules are defined by what is appropriate or exemplary behavior (2009: 
2). This is an important in order “to fulfill an identity is to follow appropriate rules, 
however actors rely on their own accounts and interpretations of political history and 
their role within in” (Balasco 2010: 18). Thus, perception also plays a large part in 
construction of identity and thus how they view others resulting in certain actions and 
behaviors. This further stipulates that actors’ behaviors are motivated by what is 
culturally appropriate not by what would necessarily bring the most efficiency as a 
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result of their decision. According to March and Olsen, “actors seek to fulfill obligations 
encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and 
its ethos, practices and expectations” (2009: 3). In more practical terms, this means that 
certain practices from the wider context are adopted in order to enhance its legitimacy. 
This wider context is often referred to as “context-bound rationality,” which means 
looking at the social contexts “within which individual and group interest and norms are 
formed” (Mackey 2009: 256).	  
 
1.3 Norms and International Norms 
	  
Finnermore and Sikkink further state that in line with the idea of the “logic of 
appropriateness,” in order to keep a certain status at the international level or even at the 
domestic level, states will be motivated to follow norms. When adopting a norm due to 
international pressure and when international or transnational pressure outweighs 
domestic pressure, it is called “international socialization.” This can be done either by 
“diplomatic praise or censure and supported by material incentives or sanctions…this 
socialization can go beyond states and involved networks of organizations that pressure 
states to adopt the norms, as well as monitor compliance” (Balasco 2010: 19). 
Norms have a few characteristics in which they can function as being regulative, 
constitutive or evaluative. Regulative norms can lead to an ordering of concepts and 
then constraining behaviors, while constitutive means creating new actors, interests, and 
categories of action. Evaluative norms, as the name suggests, allows for action to be 
evaluated either by a community or by a society. If a norm is evaluated negatively, this 
is commonly called “norm breaking behavior.” Of course, the opposite can happen 
where one receives praise if the a norm is adhere to; if a norm has been highly 
internalized, adhering to a norm might not elicit any type of behavior at all (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998: 892). Since the EU has mechanisms such as the European 
Commission who publishes annual Progress Reports for Turkey as a candidate country, 
norms within the scope of this thesis will be looked at as evaluative norms. 
 
1.4 Norm Entrepreneurs and Norm Leaders 
	  
Following from these ideas, there are also “norm entrepreneurs” who are “actors 
who seek to propagate specific ideas about what they see as appropriate or desired 
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behavior for the community.” The reason why they are given this title is because they 
are in a way the agenda setter – they are able to frame the ideas that they want to 
propagate and they have the power to be able to define and interpret these ideas. By 
doing this, they are setting the standards and limits as to how a problem, concept or idea 
is viewed. According to Barasco, “morm entrepreneurs often construct these new 
cognitive frames in environments of already existing norms, and thus are forced to 
compete with and contest these new norms” (2010: 14). In order to be able to aid these 
norm entrepreneurs, there are “norm leaders” that “can be considered to be those 
organizations or individuals responsible for enacting and/or monitoring compliance to a 
norm” (Barasco 2010: 6). Within the realm of this framework, the EU can be considered 
the norm entrepreneur, while feminist organizations can be considered the norm leaders 
in carrying out these norms and values. 
 
1.5 Norm Diffusion and the EU 
	  
The EU has been described as a normative power (Manners 2006, Tocci 2008). 
The EU can diffuse its norms to either already-existing Member States by pushing 
specific norms or in candidate countries by promulgating shared European norms such 
as “freedom of movement, uncorrupt governments, a single market, and strong human 
rights” (Slobodchikoff 2010: 1-2). By adopting these norms, the assumption is that 
states would become more democratic and in turn would inevitably achieve the peace 
and stability that the EU strives for. Several scholars argue that the EU uses integration 
as way to diffuse norms among candidate countries during the accession process as 
articulated by the Copenhagen Criteria, which encompasses political and economic 
stability as well as acquiescence to the EU acquis  (Tocci 2008, Slobodchikoff 2010). 
As Slobodchikoff states, “…by pursuing integration, the European Union can influence 
other states by the power of its ideas and norms and ensure democratic member states 
that share European normative values” (2010:6). Therefore, in appealing to potential 
member states, the EU is able to offer membership while the candidate musts adopt EU 
norms and values. 
This process of adapting norms can also be referred to as Europeanization in 
which internal structures are altered in order to be compatible with EU standards. Thus, 
one common topic is how much a country adapts to norms depending on how large the 
gap is between domestic standards and EU standards. Within the Europeanization 
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literature, some scholars point to the idea that “the larger the gap between the two 
standards, the larger the EU pressure on the country” (Marshall 2013: 117). If looking at 
Turkey in adopting gender equality directives, we can say that the gap between the 
country standards and EU standards was high, therefore the EU placed a great deal of 
pressure on the Turkish government. Political conditionality acted as further leverage as 
 
…the EU expanded its policies on gender equality over the years, it required 
candidates to fulfill those conditions before accession to the EU. The result has 
been the requirement from the EU that Turkey transpose all the existing EU 
directives on gender equality, sign all the necessary international agreements (eg. 
CEDAW, the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention, and the European Social 
Charter (Marshall 2012: 118) 
 
With the expectations to sign these aforementioned international agreements the EU 
places pressure on Turkey via the annual European Commission Progress Reports. 
While the Progress Reports simultaneously acted as way monitor and pressure candidate 
countries into conforming to norms, it also frame subjects such as gender equality that 
would have long-lasting implications on the women’s movement in Turkey. The 
Reports in the late 90s and early 2000s not only highlighted the need for Turkey to 
change its Civil Code to meet the standards of CEDAW but also framed women’s issues 
as human rights issues. Furthermore, the membership process that followed the decision 
made at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, which pushed Turkey into the status of official 
candidate member of the EU also provided organizations that worked on women’s 
issues with the platform to continue pushing for rights through advocacy and lobbying 
efforts in appealing to the government and to parliament on further changes. This not 
only empowered women and feminist organizations but also allowed for the EU to 
diffuse its norms  (Marshall 2012: 200).  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
Are we not human, too? Is it only because of our sex that we have lagged behind? 
 
Rabia Hanım (1868) 
 
Humankind is made up of two sexes, women and men. Is it possible for humankind to 
grow by the improvement of only one part while the other part is ignored? Is it possible 
that if half of a mass is tied to earth with chains that the other half can soar into skies? 
 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
 
 
 
Even though Turkey was one of the first countries in 1934 among its European 
counterparts to extend the right to vote to women, Turkey has consistently fared poorly 
on international indexes designed to monitor gender equality in all aspects of society. 
That is not to say that the women’s movement has failed to make great strides in 
influencing policy – in fact the Turkish women’s movement has become increasing 
influential in Turkey’s political scene and within its larger process of democratization 
(Knaus 2007: 48). This struggle has been fought largely by actors within the women’s 
movement in regard to legal changes that have pushed for further equality. Of course, 
legal changes are not a panacea in achieving gender equality within a society but have 
formed the foundation with women’s organizations pressuring the government, running 
awareness raising campaigns, and being involved in service provision – the women’s 
movement is faced with many challenges that need to be fought on several fronts in 
order to realize change in society. 
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In order to really be able to fully grasp the goals, aims, intentions, and discourse 
of contemporary feminist organizations in Turkey, it is vital to have a firm grip on the 
historical influences and major milestones that have shaped mentalities and motivations 
undergirding the women’s movement today. This historical backdrop will serve as a 
good foundation in comprehending the forces that have shaped and continue to shape 
the perceptions of feminist organizations in Turkey. Due to the recent prominence of the 
women’s movement in Turkey regarding politics, it is worth examining the roots of this 
movement in order to gain a fuller understanding of how its attitudes have evolved 
toward the EU in recent years. 
Throughout much of Turkey’s history, the women’s movement has largely been 
viewed as a political issue. This is a common theme throughout the literature on the 
women’s movement in which state-endorsed feminism was rarely questioned as it had 
elevated the status of women to such an extent in order to be able to reach the goal of 
modernization. Much emphasis has been placed in passing laws through Parliament that 
grant greater equality and freedoms to women – in other words, in the name of 
democratization. In the same vein, it is worthwhile to trace the history of legal reforms 
while still remaining aware of the downfalls of only viewing the promulgation of 
women’s rights in a legal framework. However, once it became clear that legal reforms 
did not suffice in making widespread social changes, the narrative of the women’s 
movement shifted focus to changing the mentality in order to enact long-lasting progress 
regarding gender equality. Many feminist organizations in Turkey have reflected the 
change of narrative by focusing not only on the increased participation of women in 
both the political and economic spheres but also on social issues including honor crimes, 
domestic violence, child brides, educational opportunities, among others. 
 
2.1 The Three Phases of the Women’s Movement in Turkey 
	  
While there are generally two different ways to confront the history of the women’s 
movement in Turkey – the first tracing the women’s movement alongside the major 
political developments in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. The second approach analyzes 
the historical development of the women’s movement based on women’s demands and 
dictates that the women’s movement in Turkey is in its second stage. I choose to analyze 
the history of the women’s movement by the three different phases it has been through 
stemming from the Tanzimat Reforms in the Ottoman Empire, the Republican Empire, 
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and the feminist movement since the 1980 military coup. This is because the women’s 
movement in Turkey has from the beginning been framed as a political issue and has 
thus been at the whim of the major political movements in Turkey (Coşar 2008: 327). 
 
2.1.2 The Ottoman Empire 
	  
Commonly overlooked in common discourse is that the extent of the women’s 
movement in Turkey can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire. Even though the 
women’s movement started as early as the Ottoman Empire does not necessarily 
indicate that the movement was either widespread or lead to an earlier societal 
transformation in an increasingly progressive fashion. As the Ottoman Empire had 
slowly and painfully realized the superiority of Europe first through military defeats 
then politically, economically, and socially, there were early attempts at changing 
certain aspects of society in order to reach the standard of Europe. As Sirman points out 
that “it was reformist men whose main concern was to find ways to revive a floundering 
empire, who voiced concern about the position of women in society (1989: 3) or as 
Gündüz days “the oppression of women was seen as an obstacle for the modernization 
of the Empire” (2004: 115). 
The beginning of solving this issue was first done legally. In fact, there was no 
legal code to speak of in the Ottoman Empire until Sultan Abdülmecit promulgated the 
Tanzimat Reforms in 1839 meaning that previously “the law was applied differently to 
different members of society depending on their social status, gender, profession, 
religion or religious sect” (Ilkkaracan 1997:3). No legal measures governing marriage 
had existed previously since Islamic law dictated the rules of marriage. It was during 
this time that we start to see a growing divide between the two schools of thought 
regarding women’s status in society. It was also during this time that the question of 
women came into debate with a divide between the reformists and the conservatives. 
 
…the modernists particularly criticized arranged marriages, polygamy and 
gender segregation and advocated the free access of women to education and 
‘free love.’ The conservatives, on the other hand, saw these reforms as being 
influenced by western thought and a threat to the prevailing cultural identity; and 
they stressed the need to preserve the current status of women (Ilkkaracan 
1997:3). 
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Much of the struggle for women’s freedoms during the women’s movements 
during both the Ottoman Empire and in modern Turkey can be viewed as a dichotomy 
with one side challenging the status quo and the other striving to protect the status quo. 
Or at least during the women’s movement, the sides has been defined as to how they 
position themselves around the status quo – in other words, the actors in the women’s 
movement either challenge or try to preserve that status quo of women in society. 
Because Turkey experienced so much political and economic turmoil from 
fighting continuous wars on all fronts from the beginning of the 20th century, the 
question of women’s place in society started to become an even more fundamental 
question as stated by Tekeli, 
 
It was during the war years that women obtained some of the right they had 
fought for: they were admitted to universities in 1914; they were allowed to 
work in factories and the public service in 1915; and in 1917, the “family act” 
recognized the right to limit polygamy to Muslim women... (2010: 120). 
 
Although the polygamy ban was to be implemented at a later date, it speaks volumes as 
to the issues that were raised and signaled progress in Turkish society toward the 
emancipation of women. 
The early 20th century in Turkey not only saw the proliferation of war but also 
that of women’s magazines and associations which addressed a variety of women’s 
issues. It must be noted that the feminist movement that has taken shape in Turkey is far 
from monolithic. However, when women’s movement started in the Ottoman Empire, 
“Ottoman feminists were generally educated women from the major cities of the 
Empire” (Knaus: 2007: 50). After the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) 
disposed of Abdulhamit in 1908 in favor of bringing back the Constitution, nearly a 
dozen women’s associations popped up with functions running the gamut from service 
provision to fighting for women’s rights (Kandiyoti 1991: 29). Furthermore, there were 
nearly 40 women’s magazines published alongside several women’s associations that 
varied in their aim, size, and scope. Even though the women’s groups and publications 
revealed the diverse character of the emerging women’s movement, there were issues 
that were common across the board including gaining the right for women to get a 
divorce, abolishing of polygamy and arranged marriages, creating jobs for women, the 
right for women to participate in the workforce, and the right to have an education 
(Ilkkaracan 1997:4). While these groups were championing universal rights, they were 
quite exclusionary. For example, the Society for the Elevation of Women (Teali-iNisvan 
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Cemiyeti) was founded regarding women’s suffrage – but everyone who joined that club 
had to know English, indicating the eliteness of this club. In addition to politically-
oriented associations, there was also the Society for the Defense of Women’s Rights 
(Müdafaa-iHukuk-iNisvan Cemiyeti), who was mainly concerned with the right of 
women to have access to paid professions. 
 
 
2.1.3 Beginnings of the Republic 
	  
After the end of WWI and its agreement that culminated in the Sevres Treaty, 
which carved Turkey among the Allied Powers, Atatürk was among one of the generals 
to fight the War of Independence to regain Turkey. In this context, Atatürk founded 
Turkey as a republic in 1923. He had the two main objectives of building Turkey as a 
nation-state and in further modernizing this state. In the name of these two objectives, 
Atatürk abolished both the Sultanate and the Caliphate in an attempt to end sharia law, 
which also worked in accomplishing a complete break with Turkey’s Ottoman past. 
Furthermore, this allowed for Atatürk to place religion under state control by 
establishing the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), Atatürk made 
sweeping legal and social reforms touched nearly every aspect of life ranging from the 
religious symbol of the caliphate, the educational system, transportation, the 
Romanizing of the alphabet, and the change in dress code, among others. The change in 
dress code essentially meant wearing what was deemed to be Western wear, included 
western-style headgear. This, of course, had implications on the wearing of both the fez 
(traditional religious headgear for men) and the veil, which is a contentious issue still in 
debate too (Zürcher 1993: 172-175). 
In addition to all these aforementioned reforms, the Civil Code was changed as 
well in 1926; in 1926, a new civil code that strongly resembled the Swiss Civil Code. As 
Kandiyoti differentiates these sweeping reforms from the Tanzimat Reforms, 
 
Unlike previous attempts at legislative reform which remained mindful of the 
provisions of the Shariah, this Code severed all links with it. Polygyny was 
outlawed and marriage partners were given equal rights to divorce and child 
custody. Although veiling was not legally banned, a vigorous propaganda 
campaign led by Ataturk himself exhorted women to adopt modern styles of 
dress, and dissenters were dealt with severely (1991: 23). 
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The Swiss civil code also gave women the right to inherit the same as men as 
well as the right to vote. This had the effect of “women became more visible in the 
urban space with their husbands” (Bayraktar 2009: 28). Women then were able to gain 
the right to vote at both the local level (1930) and the national level (1934). However, 
“the right to vote did not lead to further politization of women” (Gündüz 2004: 116). In 
other words, due to a top-down approach, women did not automatically begin 
participating in politics as the numbers of women in Parliament today prove that there 
was lag time between the law getting passed and women actually partaking in the 
political process. 
Even though these reforms seem revolutionary for the time considering the state 
of Europe during that time in the early 20th century, these rights such as outlawing 
polygamy, women’s suffrage, or granting women the right to get a divorce, were 
actually quite limited. They were only a means to an end – with secularism and the 
integrity of the state during the time of state building as the end (Landig 2011: 207). 
Furthermore, many of the reforms were not realized. There were only 3.8% of paid 
women workers in 1955 and even as late as 1975, 51.8% of women were illiterate. The 
problem lay in the fact that the common discourse at that time was that Atatürk’s 
reforms were bestowed upon women especially before women in Europe, meaning that 
efforts to help women in groups or associations were mainly geared toward providing 
services “instead of questioning the role that the Republic had determined for them” 
(Ilkkaracan 1997: 6). 
Prominent feminist activist and scholar Şirin Tekeli claims that because Atatürk 
was open enough to pass such reforms in the name of modernization, hence 
secularization, women were among the staunchest of supporters for the fight for 
secularism (2010: 119). Even though these sweeping changes advanced the cause of 
women’s rights during the early Republic, there were still signs that women could not 
go too far in this newly established mentality of state feminism. For example, women’s 
freedom to association or participate in organizational life was limited. Early attempts at 
getting more women in political decision-making bodies can be seen as early as 1925. A 
women’s political party was established under the leadership of Nezihe Muhittin called 
Kadınlar Halk Firkası (TKB, Women’s People Party). However, this all women’s 
political party was never officially recognized by the Turkish state (Müftüler-Baç 2012). 
Women were able to bec
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1935 when women were elected to Parliament, which was another distinguishing 
characteristic for Turkey from its European counterparts.  
 
It was an association that was found after a contradiction between women’s 
movement which wished to establish a women’s party and the state who did not 
allow such an experience, which instead accepted the formation of a women’s 
association (Bayraktar 2009: 29) 
 
The first Law on Associations in 1928, which effectively blocked the forming of 
associations that were based on gender (the word “gender” was later removed from the 
law in 1946). TKB reopened its associational doors in 1949 with the following motto: 
 
to support, proliferate, and raise Turkish mothers who are cultured to the nation, 
comprehensive of their rights, who know how and when to use their rights, who 
serve their husbands and children with conscious knowledge, who respond to 
every trouble with loyalty and no self-demands. 
 
This motto shows the almost institutionalization of this type of thought in the way in 
which the young Republic in the creation a new type of citizen with the added intent of 
bringing women into the public sphere as “women were perceived as the carriers and 
symbols of secularism and modernity; hence ‘women’s rights,’ ‘women’s liberation,’ 
and ‘women’s visibility’ became essential to the Kemalist discourse” (Özcetin 2009: 
108). While these women were seen as the main glue that kept the family together, 
which was seen as an essential unit of society, they were also expected to be more 
visible in public but as a chaste figure. Many women were trained in several professions 
such as lawyers and doctors during this time period, which differed from those who 
participated in the women’s movement in Europe, making the women’s movement in 
Turkey based on merit. This new network of women professionals provided the main 
foundation for the next wave of feminism was set by the new network of women 
professionals at this time. 
 
2.1.3 1980’s to Present Day 
 
The second wave feminism that became popular in the West during the 60s and 
70s sparked the larger global women’s movement in the 70s, which also saw the 
beginning of a series of international UN conventions that addressed women issues. 
However, the broader implications of such a women’s movement that stressed equality 
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in development and more specifically the workplace did not manifest itself in Turkey 
until nearly a decade later. 
The 1980s in Turkey is often viewed in the literature on the women’s movement 
as the beginning of the last (and most current) phase of the women’s movement and 
coincides with the military coup. The 1980 military coup came on the heels of a decade 
of extreme political and social instability in which the military “suppressed all kinds of 
social opposition by force, applied a systematic depolitization of the masses and formed 
the basis of neo-liberalist policies proposed by the IMF and capitalist forces. In this 
atmosphere of repression and fear, the first new social movement which demonstrated 
the courage to be in opposition and articulate its demands was the women’s movement” 
(Ilkkaracan 1997: 7-8). 
 
The 1980 military coup in Turkey initiated a political vacuum by banning almost 
all former political activities of the political parties, associations and unions. 
During the early 1980s, women who were part of the social movement prior to 
the ban of the military established feminist women’s groups. The feminist 
women’s groups were created when women started to view critically their own 
roles and participation in the socialist movement. From the early 1980s, 
feminists began to question Kemalist ideology in terms of its effects on women. 
While the socialist movement and the feminist women’s organizations had 
initiated their own critique of Kemalist reforms from the early 1980s, it was the 
rise of radical Islam that decisively determined the positions of women’s 
organizations across the political spectrum (Esim 1999: 181). 
 
As Şirin Tekeli (2010: 120) points out, because Kemalism and leftist ideology 
did not really permit the women’s movement in blossoming, the fact that the military 
did not allow for political movement after the intervention paved the way for a 
“democratic and pluralistic women’s movement” (Gündüz 2004: 117). It was only in 
this context that the women’s movement for the first time since the founding of the 
Republic was able to question the state ideology and its conception of women in society, 
thereby questioning the status quo. 
Thus, it would naturally follow logically that the first series of mobilizing 
women in the form of meetings and demonstrations on a large scale in modern Turkey 
was done as a reaction to state policies. The late 1980s witnessed the power of the 
mobilization of this new women’s movement. A mass protest of around 3,000 women 
was held on May 17, 1987 in response to a court decision denying a woman a divorce 
on the grounds that her husband was abusing her physically. This protest also marked 
the first national protest since 1980 (Şirman 1989: 17). Furthermore, a year later a group 
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of women sent a petition with 7,000 signatures to Parliament protesting Turkey’s 
reservations and demanding the implementation of the UN Convention for the 
Elimination of any Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Gündüz 2004: 119). In 
1989, the movement mobilized 800 women to participate in the First Women’s 
Congress to air complains and grievances and went onto further publish the “Manifesto 
for the Rescue of Women.” 
One of the most pressing issues in the early part of the third women’s movement 
in Turkey was the domestic violence endured by women in society. Not only was 
domestic violence not viewed as a crime but the mentality of the state was that they 
should not interfere in family affairs. Large-scale protests and a campaign launched by 
Mor Çatı were successful in awareness raising and bringing the topic onto the agenda as 
it had not previously been discussed. These aforementioned types of activities that had a 
wide outreach that raised awareness as to the plight of the women in Turkish society. 
With the visibility of the women’s movement also came the visibility of the different 
divides in Turkish society. Because the women’s movement transcends party, class, and 
ethnic lines, different ideologies were accepted into the movement and participation was 
encouraged making the women’s movement more pluralistic. 
One of the most important ways that women’s movement has tried to not only 
bring gender equality to the rest of Turkey but also to question the patriarchal structure 
of society has been through changing the existing legal frameworks of the Civil and 
Penal Code. Thanks to the efforts of this women’s movement in conjunction with the 
first couple years of Turkey being a candidate country to the EU, there were several 
laws that were passed in the name of expanding gender equality. These reforms to both 
Codes were seen as a necessary move in order to begin changing a mindset of the state 
in its role in both public and private spheres as well as changing the mindset of society 
in how women are to be viewed. 
Several problems existed in the Civil Code that needed to be addressed with 
regard to gender equality. The Civil Code had in fact been amended several times in the 
90s and again in the early 2000s by the coalition government. Article 159 was abolished 
in the early 90s as it stipulated that a women had to get permission from her husband in 
order to work. In 1997, Article 153 was abolished as it allowed the women to keep her 
last name should she choose after marriage. In the following year, the government 
implemented the Law for Protection of the Family, which allowed for protection against 
domestic violence (Gündüz 2004: 123). 
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The Civil Code was more extensively revised in 2002 with more than 1,000 
additions to the Code. One of the most important deletions in an attempt to change the 
aforementioned mindset of both the state and the broader society was that of the article 
that stated the man was the head of the household. Furthermore, the legal age to be able 
to get married was raised for both men and women, bastard children were given the 
same rights, and single potential parents were allowed to adopt children (Gündüz 2004: 
123). The new Code “granted women an equal share in goods and property accumulated 
during marriage” (Müftüler-Baç 2005:23) as well as equal rights over the home. 
The women’s movement was also successful in reforming the Penal Code in 
order to be able to fit a liberal framework, which was finalized in 2005. A platform 
called the “Women’s Platform on the Penal Code” redrafted the sections that were 
relevant to women in the reformed Penal Code in redefining sexual crimes as “crimes 
against individuals” instead of “crimes against public morality” (Arat 2010), stronger 
sentences for sexual and “honor” crimes, criminalizing harassment and marital rape, 
increasing the penalties for domestic violence and sexual transgressions towards minors. 
While the women’s movement was obviously involved in the redrafting of this law, they 
were also active when the then Prime Minister tried to criminalize adultery, signaling 
one of the biggest political crises to date between Turkey and the EU. This would have 
implied that women would be the ones who were punished had adultery been 
criminalized because 
 
it was more common for men to commit adultery rather than women and women 
would not be able to sue their husbands for adultery both because they would 
have less access to law and also because there would be social pressure against 
exposing their husbands” (Arat 2010). 
 
Women’s groups responded by organizing a march in Ankara with the slogan “Our 
bodies and sexuality belong to ourselves” (qtd in Ilkkaracan 247). Feminists were able 
to get the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) involved to apply pressure on the 
government by the EU and raised awareness through the media, which sparked a debate 
in the government. Even the ministers were at odds with each other – the Justice 
Minister did not think that adultery needed to be criminalized while the Women’s 
Minister stated, “We cannot give up our own values just because we want to join the 
EU. Adultery is not considered a crime in many countries of the world. But just because 
this is the case...we cannot just accept it…we have to respect the values of Turkish 
society” (qtd in Ilkkaracan 248). Erdoğan backed down from his proposal to criminalize 
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adultery after meeting with the then-EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen 
(Ilkkaracan 247) who had initially made the following statement regarding the proposed 
ban on adultery: “I cannot understand how a measure like this could be considered at 
such a time – it can only be a joke” (qtd. In “Turkey signals U-turn…” BBC News). This 
further serves as an example as to how lobbying from local organizations to 
international NGOs, in this case EWL, worked to sway policy. 
Following the reforms to the Penal Code, the AKP also took steps towards 
addressing the problem of violence against women. Honor crimes rate among one of the 
biggest challenges that face Turkey especially in the international arena where the issue 
is commonly discussed. In July 2006, the Prime Ministry issued a decree called the 
Prevention of Violence Against Women. This decree signaled a further shift in the 
mentality at the governmental level in terms of how the state views itself and its role in 
issues such as domestic violence. Whereas women protested in 1987 because the 
judiciary ruled based on the mentality that it was not the state’s place to intervene in the 
private sphere, this decree says that the state takes responsibility in preventing violence 
against women. Furthermore, the decree also contained a detailed plan of how to solve 
violence against women by listing state and civil society actors that it plans to work with 
– meaning that this opened channels for civil society actors and the state to be able to 
work together on one of the most prevalent issues in today’s Turkish society (Arat 
2010).  
 
2.1 Women’s Organizations in Turkey 
 
After having traced some of the major developments of the women’s movement 
towards broader emancipation by looking at social, legal, and political milestones in 
Turkey, it is now worth turning specifically to feminist organizations and the role they 
play within the within the wider context of the women’s movement in Turkey. I will 
provide a definition of what is meant by a women’s organization and further feminist 
organizations in order to avoid possible conceptual confusion. 
Considering that feminist organizations are still relatively in their nascent stage 
of development after having only really begun during the 1980s, discussing the general 
characteristics that have been shared by women’s organizations in the context of being 
in Turkey invariably reveals a number of deficiencies and limitations in order perform 
their desired functions within the movement. While the 90s marked the years of “street 
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feminism” in which many protested in the streets, the 2000s has been labeled by Bora 
and Günal as “project feminism” (qtd in Asuman 2012: 4) which has “transformed 
political aims to technical project goals and militancy into ‘activism’ and weakened the 
political content of the feminist movement” (Asuman 2012: 5). 
Furthermore, this section will also peer into general problems in Turkish society 
addressed by women’s organizations in order to gain a more accurate picture of their 
activities and functions. By looking at the problems faced by women in society and 
taken on by women’s organization in civil society, I also hope to illustrate the civil 
society, nation state, and EU nexus in how some of these problems are addressed and 
resolved. Women’s organizations in Turkey have undoubtedly been affected by the EU 
in a number of ways – increasingly so since the 1999 Helsinki Summit in which Turkey 
was listed as a candidate country that was “destined to join the Union on the basis of the 
same criteria as applied to other candidate States” and to “benefit from a pre-accession 
strategy to stimulate and support its reforms, which will include enhanced political 
dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria with 
particular reference to human rights (Helinski European Council 1999).  
 
2.1.1 Definition of Women’s Organizations 
 
A women’s organization could be defined as an organization that was founded by 
women and intends to benefit women through collective action. The main aim of 
women’s organizations is to change gender politics and this can be done in a number of 
different ways. According to Esim, 
 
Women’s organizations are established as associations or foundations in Turkey. 
While associations emphasize human resources and membership, foundations 
focus on assets and the distribution of resources. Foundations are traditional 
social institutions of goodwill inherited from the early days of the Ottoman 
Empire. Foundations and associations are subject to the provisions of the Civil 
Code. Both have to secure state approval and financial reviews in order to 
operate (1999: 181). 
 
While women’s organizations span a wide ideological spectrum such as state feminism, 
Kurdish feminism, Islamic conservative, liberal feminism, among others, this thesis will 
specifically focus on feminist organizations that operate on liberal feminist principles 
(Arat 2010).  
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2.1.2 Limitations Previously Faced by Women’s Organizations 
 
The way in which women’s organizations tend to approach gender issues in 
Turkey is and has been influenced by political and social approaches. In other words, 
women’s organizations in Turkey are at the whim of the political and social context it 
finds itself in. This has been true since the beginning of the women’s movement and 
remains true even today with the added element of globalization, in the scope of this 
thesis we will talk specifically about the EU. 
Women’s organizations “have developed across the political spectrum in 
response to influences such as changes in the focus and priorities of donor agencies, the 
history of political movements in Turkey, and contemporary power struggles among 
political and social groups in Turkey” (Esim 1999:180). These women’s organizations 
are still at the whim of all these forces and the different directions that has taken the 
women’s organizations with the added element of international institutions such as the 
EU. This is partially due to the fact that feminist organizations that have been 
interviewed in this thesis are not able to sustain themselves financially meaning they 
have to actively fundraise and appeal to inter- and supranational institutions. When 
applying to funding at EU institutions, they must meet certain criteria that nevertheless 
shape their goals and missions of the organization. 
In the mid 90s, there were 211 women’s associations in Turkey with the aim of 
getting women into all (social, economic, and political) life however there were 
obviously deficiencies as public opinion was low for these associations (Keskin 1997). 
In a survey conducted in the mid 90’s, 25% of people said that initiatives started by the 
women’s movement were not successful – while 33% of women said that they were not 
interested in politics or issues regarding women’s rights (Koray 1995: 60).	  
Funding continues to be a problem but was widespread throughout Turkey and 
among most of the women’s organizations, but especially feminist organizations. When 
women’s organizations started becoming more prevalent throughout Turkey in the 90s, 
Esim pointed out, 
 
Women’s organizations that have extensive national funding through private 
funds are those with religious agendas. Those with family planning agendas 
receive support from international donor agencies such as the International 
Planned Parenthood (IPPF). Those with religious agendas receive backing from 
other private religious funds and organizations such as the Islamic Municipalities 
and foundations (1999: 186). 
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Esim further states that there was sufficient funding for Kemalist camps of 
thinking in Turkey during the 90s as well. However, because feminism was not 
widespread in the way of thinking with a relatively polarized society between 
conservatives and Kemalist camps, burgeoning feminist organizations had it the worst 
regarding prospects for funding. While feminist organizations would not be able to get 
much support at the national level, this has forced them to look abroad to other 
alternatives in order to garner political and funding support. 
As a candidate country, there are 50 million Euros that go to Turkey as part of 
preaccession funding and 2.5 of that 50 million goes toward organizations and projects 
that work toward greater democratization of human rights in general, in which women’s 
issues would fall. The organizations interviewed in this thesis and many other women’s 
organizations around Turkey lack funding  - 
 
nevertheless, women’s organizations both in Turkey and in Greece shared a 
common ‘dependency’ on project-based funding from non-domestic sources. By 
providing funds and encouraging civil society development, the EU had a 
positive impact on women’s groups’ mobilization and networking (Elsen-Ziya) 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EU, TURKEY, AND GENDER EQUALITY 
 
 
 
 
The human rights of women are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal 
human rights. The full and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, 
social and cultural life at the national, regional, and international levels, and the 
eradication of all forms of discrimination on the grounds of sex are priority objectives 
of the international community. 
 
-The 1993 Declaration of Vienna World Conference on Human Rights 
 
 
While Gender Equality is a common objective and a common value of the entire EU, the 
Consensus recognizes Gender Equality as a goal in its own right. 
 
COM 2007 2 
 
 
After experiencing two destructive world wars in the first half of the 20th 
century, several European institutions were established to ensure that no war on a 
massive scale like the two world wars would be fought again on European soil 
(Wallensteen 2002). One of these institutions, first known as the European Community 
(EC) before becoming the European Union (EU) stressed the importance of human 
rights. Europe has been seen around the world as being the epitome of human rights 
including women’s rights as the West has taken credit as pioneer of human rights 
around the world. However, this was not always the case. This chapter is divided into 
three sections. The first section delineates the history of how the EU evolved into 
incorporating all the ingredients necessary in further promoting gender equality to one 
only its Member State but also the candidate countries. The second part of this chapter 
will look at the intersection between the EU and Turkish civil society, more specifically 
feminist organizations. The third section will then trace the history of the relationship 
between the EU and Turkey 
	  	  32 
Although this might be the case, the EU has at times lagged behind in putting 
women’s rights onto the agenda. As one scholar points out, 
 
…during the Central and Eastern European enlargement process, the EU was 
often criticized for its shortcomings to integrate gender mainstreaming as well as 
the private sphere gender equality issues into its enlargement policy (Özdemir 
2014: 120). 
 
The best way in which the EU can continue to hold status as heralding human 
rights is through political conditionality it holds over member states during the 
membership accession process. Before potential member states can be accepted into the 
fold of the EU, each state has to fulfill a set of political criteria (the Copenhagen 
Criteria) and must be able to harmonize their legal framework (acquis communitaire) 
with that of the EU’s. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to outline the major changes made within the 
EU with regards to its treaties, charters, institutions and other mechanisms that strive 
toward greater gender equality and how civil society in Turkey and the EU have 
constructed a symbiotic relationship through these aforementioned channels. This 
undoubtedly will show the relationship between feminist organizations that are so 
instrumental to the women’s movement in Turkey. The relationships that have been 
formed through several platforms, initiatives and projects have been instrumental to the 
way in which feminist and women’s organizations in Turkey perceive not only the 
women’s issues and status in society but also in the way they perceive the EU in 
reference to its place in the women’s movement in Turkey.   
 
3.1 European Governance 
 
The end of the 20th century marked a time in which the European Commission 
was able to further expand the idea of civil society in the decision- and policy-making 
process with a couple noteworthy publications. The first was the Discussion Document 
The 2001 White Paper on European governance addressed the concerns expressed by 
citizens of member states on the inaccessibility of the EU, skepticism of European 
institutions, the fact that citizens feel alienated from the work done by the EU, the 
widening gap between the EU (the growing distance between European institutions and 
its people) on several levels. Therefore, the White Paper proposes to make a 
commitment to governance in order to be able to make the EU inclusive of its citizens in 
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light of anti-EU sentiments or Euro-skeptics. The governance proposed in this paper is 
not only limited to governance in Europe but also stresses the idea of global governance 
in an effort to improve its dialogue with civil society actors in third countries (this being 
relevant to us as Turkey would be considered as third country in this case). The main 
principles undergirding the White Paper were openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness, and coherence. This then further outlined the idea of creating a dialogue 
with special in interest groups, and one of these interest groups was the of women’s 
organizations and thus “the Commission has thus been active in promoting women’s 
networks and networking on gender equality issues” (Elsen-Ziya 83). 
 
3.2 Gender Equality as a fundamental right in the EU 
 
Throughout the years, one can gradually see the way in which gender equality 
has evolved in charters and treaties adopted by European institutions. The EU has made 
gender equality a basic tenet of its existence and puts it at the center of all its activities. 
This can be seen in its treaties and charters as the general trend was first that they were 
once more focused on equality in the economic sphere in the name of development – 
this has changed over time to allow for gender equality in all spheres of life. Article 119 
of the 1957 Treaty of Rome stated that the European Economic Community (EEC) 
would strive for equal pay for men and women. In fact, feminists in the early 1970s used 
the aforementioned Article 119 in the Rome Treaty to appeal to European policy makers 
(Mazey 1998). In amending Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam proposed the amendment specifying “In all activities referred to in this 
Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality 
between men and women.” The 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union stipulates in Articles 21 and Articles 23 that equality must be ensured and 
reaffirms a ban on discrimination (which applies to more than just sex), respectively. 
The 2009 Treaty of the European Union commits Member States to non-discrimination 
and equality between women and men in Articles 2 and 3. Article 8 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union commits to fighting inequalities and to promoting 
equality between men and women, and Article 10 of the same treaty specifies fighting 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation. 
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In March of 2010, the European Commission adopted the Women’s Charter in 
order to strengthen gender equality in all policies and was then followed by the Gender 
Equality Strategy to ensure the concepts in the charter were manifested The Strategy 
addresses gender gaps that continue to exist such as the gender gap in employment by 
looking at the balance between work and life, promoting entrepreneurship among 
women as well as seeking the best practice child care. The other gaps identified by the 
Strategy are the gender pay gap and the lack of women working in management boards 
However, this does not really bind the member states to fully conform to the charter. 
 
3.2.1 EU Legislation toward gender equality 
 
Through legislation, the EU has committed to 15 European Directives between 1975 
and 2010, which are legally binding documents for all EU Member States, meaning 
these must be incorporated into their national legislation. The European Directives 
mainly has made points on the promulgation of gender equality in the workplace with 
the following stipulations in common: ensures the equal treatment of men and women at 
work, prohibits discrimination in social security plans, sets the minimum requirements 
on parental leave, provides protection to pregnant workers and recent mothers, sets out 
rules on access to employment, working conditions, remuneration and legal rights for 
the self-employed. 
3.2.2 Gender Mainstreaming in the EU 
	  
Gender mainstreaming was officially introduced in the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty 
with the term itself having been introduced into the lexicon at the Fourth UN World 
Conference, which was then made into a policy strategy at the Beijing Platform for 
Action. In fact, in highlighting the role that women’s networks played in bringing 
gender mainstreaming about, Marshall further elucidates, “the pressure from 
transnational women’s networks toward the conceptualization of women’s rights as 
human rights…aided the inclusion of gender mainstreaming in the Platform.” 
In order to address gender mainstreaming which aims to introduce the idea of 
gender equality at all stages of the policy process, the EU has several mechanisms to put 
this into action. More specifically, the EU has several channels to address the progress 
at several levels to ensure gender mainstreaming is achieved – ranging from the 
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institutional level to Parliament to working with civil society. The High-Level Group on 
Gender Mainstreaming (high-level representatives that look at gender mainstreaming at 
the national level), the Advisory Committee (composed of representatives from the 
ministries of member states, representatives from gender equality bodies, European 
social partner organization, and the European Women’s Lobby); and there are also 
formal committees such the European Pact for Gender Equality and the Beijing Platform 
for Action. 
3.2.3 EU Institutions and Gender Equality 
	  
The Trio Presidency Declarations as part of the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union are adopted in order to act as a catalyst to speed up progress made in 
Member States regarding gender equality. Furthermore, the Committee on Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality exists in the European Parliament which is responsible for 
the definition, promotion and protection of women’s rights (including in third 
countries), policies promoting equal opportunity, the removal of all forms of 
discrimination, implementing and developing gender mainstreaming policies, ensuring 
that international agreements and conventions are upheld and implemented, and 
information policy on women. 
There is also the research aspect in order to be able to keep decision-makers 
informed known as the European Institute for Gender Equality which is responsible for 
collecting and publishing information related to gender equality for policy purposes. 
The Council of Europe monitors the implementation of Article 14 and Protocol 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
At the civil society level, the European social partners are dedicated to ensuring 
gender equality especially in the work place by following the Framework of Actions on 
Gender Equality in the fields of addressing gender roles, promoting women in decision- 
making bodies, support a healthy work-life balance, and addressed the gender pay gap. 
The European Women’s Lobby acts as a gateway to civil society and is an umbrella 
organization that comprises of more than 2,500 civil society organizations – mainly 
works with EU Member States but also with two countries that are not members that 
being Macedonia and Turkey. 
3.2 The EU and Turkish Civil Society 
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Civil society actors are seen as being vital to the democratic process as they 
allow for people in all sectors of society to formulate and voice their opinion by 
providing the necessary channels with which to do so. Turkish civil society and the EU 
have a relationship of reciprocity, while throughout the accession process, the EU 
acknowledges that civil society is a vital part of having and maintaining a working 
democracy which works for the favor of the EU – in spreading their norms and values 
more quickly, largely through the accession process by using conditionality. The 
mechanism in which civil society organizations see that the EU works as a catalyst in 
achieving their aims, they have much impetus to working with each other as they view 
each other as vital in order to be able to achieve their goals (Seyrek 2004: 2). Civil 
society in general can be seen as the transmitters of “major economic, political and 
social dynamics of the EU to their countries and create the necessary environment for 
the transformation of the state and society in line with the values of European 
integration.” In fact, in COM 2004 in which civil society dialogue is stressed the 
importance to “diminish the lack of common knowledge of the EU in Turkey” (COM 
2004: 656). These civil society organizations also have the power to lobby the EU in 
order to speed up CSOs in member states have the potential to be quite active in the 
accession negotiation process. 
The way in which CSOs can influence the decision-making process in the EU in 
explained in the following procedures: 
 
There is the institutionalized procedures through direct involvement in the 
consultation committees of the European Commission, Economic and Social 
Council etc., and also a “semi-institutionalized” or “less institutionalized” 
procedure, through lobbying these institutions. Although indirect involvement is 
possible and is sometimes realized through the partner organization, the first, by 
nature, cannot be effectively used by Turkish civil society. However, the second 
process is used by Turkish civil society as effectively as the civil society 
organizations of the Member States. 
 
 
The EU is seen as being more open to lobbying activities and is a target of 
Turkish CSOs in order for them to be able to push their agenda. Even though this is the 
case and the EP provides an ideal environment for lobbying activities, “…nevertheless 
the EP is considered the most unenthusiastic EU institution when it comes to Turkey’s 
full-membership and thus changing the perspective of the EP has been politically very 
important” (Seyrek 2004: 4). 
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Table 1 – The Interaction between Turkey, the EU, and the UN 
 1980-1985 1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-2010 
Important 
Events 
Turkey 
became a 
signatory to 
CEDAW 
Turkey 
officially 
applied for 
EU 
membership 
in 1987 
EU accepted 
Copenhagen 
political 
criteria, 
1993 
 
Turkey 
accelerated 
its EU 
membership 
efforts 
 
Turkey 
became a 
signatory to 
the Beijing 
Declaration 
EU 
officially 
accepted 
Turkey’s 
membership 
application, 
1999 
 
Turkey 
enacted the 
Law on the 
Protection 
of the 
Family to 
protect 
women 
against 
domestic 
violence, 
1998 
Turkey 
amended the 
Civil Code, 
the Penal 
Code, Labor 
Law, and 
the 
Constitution 
to provide 
gender 
equality 
 
Turkey 
signed the 
Optional 
Protocol to 
CEDAW, 
2002 
 
Accession 
negotiations 
between 
Turkey and 
the EU 
begin 
Turkey 
amended it 
social 
security 
system 
 
Turkey 
introduced its 
Gender 
Equality 
Programme 
 
Parliamentary 
Commission 
of Equal 
Opportunities 
for Women 
and Men was 
established, 
2009 
Source: Marshall, Gül Aldıkaçtı. 2013. Shaping Gender Policy in Turkey: Grassroots 
Women Activists, the European Union, and the Turkish State. SUNY Albany 
 
 
3.3 Turkey – EU Relations 
 
Turkey had to become more democratic in order to be able to join the rank of the 
European Union, thus a series of political reforms was necessary in order to follow 
through a process of harmonizing both political and legal systems to match the 
Copenhagen criteria. While there have been many other countries that have gone 
through the process of Europeanization to become a member of the EU, it was more 
challenging in Turkey’s case due to the legacies left behind by the Ottoman Empire such 
as the promulgation of the political culture, the religious culture, Turkey’s geographical 
position, demographic situation 
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After a difficult process spanning over forty years, Turkey was finally granted 
candidacy in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit which inspired serious political and legal 
reforms necessary before reaching negotiation accession talks. This democratization 
process manifested itself through the implementation of criteria stipulated in the 
political conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria. The period between 1994-2004 was 
the most intense period for the adaptation of this criteria in “increased legal protection 
of social, cultural, and political rights of all Turkish citizens irrespective of religious and 
ethnic origin, the role of the military in Turkish politics, and freedom of expression in 
Turkey” (Müftüler-Baç 2005: 21). The end of 2001 marked the beginning of major 
reforms; even though there were attempts to enact reforms previously, they were not 
effective as the coalition party in charge was not able to do this effectively as well as an 
economic crisis that took priority.  The October 2001 Constitutional package amended 
the 1982 Constitution in terms of abolishing the death penalty and allowing for more 
freedom of expression. In November of 2001, a new Civil Code was put into practice in 
order to address the lack of gender equality in marriage allowing for women to claim 
their right to accumulated property in the case of a divorce. The August 2002 reform 
package included reforms to laws regarding anti-terror and allowed for languages other 
than Turkish to be broadcasted. This last reform was significant as it allowed for 
Kurdish to be broadcasted, a language that was banned from being broadcasted or taught 
in schools in the 1982 Constitution (Müftüler-Baç 2005: 21). 
The incumbent political party, AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) is a 
conservative Islamic-leaning political regime that has been in power since 2002 and ran 
on the platform of getting into the European Union. This momentum that was started in 
implementing reforms attempted to harmonize Turkey with the Copenhagen criteria 
began to slow down in 2005 and in 2006; the AKP seemed to show less enthusiasm in 
following these reforms. Furthermore, the reforms that were being carried out in the 
country indicated to EU political actors that these reforms did not adequately reflect 
some of the spirit found in the Copenhagen criteria. Even when reform fatigue was felt 
by EU officials, president of Turkey Abdullah Gül reiterated, “our reform efforts aimed 
at raising standards and practices in all areas of life to the highest contemporary 
standards will resolutely continue” (Schliefer 2006). For example, in relation to human 
rights, there were some questions raised about the lack of rights according to women in 
respect to virginity examinations and honor killings. There was also expressed concern 
about the lack of human rights among the minority of Kurds that populate the southern 
	  	  39 
and eastern regions in Turkey. As there had been several clashes between the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers Party) and the Turkish government in the 90’s as well as an 
increase in terrorism among those factions, the question of whether or not the situation 
was being dealt with in a humane way remained to be answered until the passing of 
these reforms would have ensured a more democratic approach to this crisis. However, 
in June 2006, an anti-terror law was passed that allowed for security forces to deal with 
terrorism in an arbitrary manner, and this raised eyebrows among officials in the 
European Union about the real intentions of these reforms, as they were not aligned with 
the message of the stipulated criteria (Patton 2007: 340). 
Thus, when AKP came to power in 2002, while espousing a pro-European 
stance, they were able to also appeal to a new bourgeoisie rising in Anatolia composed 
of a class of devout Muslim businessmen and women who also wanted to propagate 
modernizing reforms for economic purposes. Before the AKP came to power there was 
a lot of fragmentation among the coalition party that ruled the country combined with a 
severe economic crisis, which created a group of voters disenchanted with previous 
regimes, therefore the AKP received their vote in addition to the up and coming 
Anatolian devout bourgeoisie; however, the government did not receive that vote 
through pure loyalty to the party, instead as a technique of ensuring that previous parties 
in the coalitions would not be able to pass the 10% threshold required to enter 
Parliament. On top of this, the AKP was able to garner much support by steering clear 
of Islamic ideology and terminology and was successful in distancing itself through a 
rhetoric based on differentiation from previously religious Islamic parties. Furthermore, 
by adopting a stance based on a neoliberal free market economy, emphasis on human 
rights and democracy as well as the intention to become a part of the European Union, 
the AKP was able to attain a wide base of supporters. Hence, the dramatic shift in public 
weighed heavily on the steps that the AKP took in slowing down the promulgation of 
EU-inspired democratizing reforms. 
One of the main ways in which this has been done is through the EU – while 
there are arguments suggesting alternative methods in Turkey joining the global 
community, the EU provides the most comprehensive set of mechanisms to ensure its 
goals are reached to act as a counter system of checks to democratic deficiencies in 
Turkey, the most amount of funding, and up until recently has provided much impetus 
in introducing reforms (Arat 2010: 870). In this way, it’s important in order to 
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understand the way in which the EU is perceived as it has such sway in the process of 
democratization in present and future member countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  41 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EMERGENCE OF AN ALTERNATE NARRATIVE: DEBATES 
SURROUNDING WOMEN’S ISSUES 
 
 
All the problems faced by women in society in today’s Turkey can be 
undergirded by certain mindsets perpetuated within culture. Within this culture is a 
patriarchal mindset has reduced the view of women and relegated women to a certain 
and narrow role in society. In Turkey, it is almost impossible within the past couple 
years to discuss the major issues faced by women without talking about politics. As 
conservative Islam has made its way into politics, the incumbent political party AKP has 
been perpetuating a view of women in Turkish society that relegates women to a 
secondary status, running counterintuitive to the norms and values promulgated by the 
EU. 
Because the historiography of the women’s movement tells us that feminist 
organizations tend to galvanize around social and political issues – and further that 
social issues regarding women’s place in society is usually placed on the agenda 
intentionally or unintentionally by politicians, it thus follows that we look at each issue 
and how it has been portrayed recently in the media and referred to by politicians by 
analyzing their discourse in understanding the type of environment that has been shaped 
in which women’s organizations operate in. This environment then has direct bearings 
on the way in which activists in feminist organizations view not only themselves but 
also those outside themselves such as a supranational institution like the EU. Therefore, 
this chapter will further serve as an understanding of the debates surrounding the issues 
by looking at the legal reforms at both international and domestic levels and programs 
initiated to see the different approaches regarding an attempt at gender equality.  I will 
hopefully further be able to shed light on the way in which EU mechanisms have 
worked with these issues as a diplomatic way to censure norm breakers through EU 
Progress Reports and statements released by the European Parliament; however this has 
proven to be moot in recent history as the Turkish government no longer seeks 
legitimation from the EU. This has happened on several occasions especially recently in 
the area of human rights. While this will not be an exhaustive list of all the issues 
plaguing women in today’s society, this chapter looks at both domestic violence and 
abortion. While domestic violence has long been an issue in public debate with much 
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legal progress being made to this end and much more interaction between Turkey, civil 
society, and the EU has occurred. On the other hand, the issue of abortion is an issue 
that had not been publicly debated before after the 1982 Constitution. A closer look at 
both of these issues reveals the way in which the Turkish government has shifted the 
narrative in both cases that allow for more conservative values to come through, shaping 
the environment of civil society and thus feminist organizations. 
 
4.1 Domestic Violence 
	  
Domestic violence has been one of the largest and widely ignored problems until 
relatively recently facing women in Turkey Some studies that claim that 47% of the 
population experiencing domestic violence, with only 8% seeking help in response to 
this violence (Hacettepe University 2011). Other studies have claimed that this number 
is as low as 3%. Domestic violence can take on different forms as can be described as 
anything that includes rape, stabbings, kicking, fractured skulls, being starved, being 
locked up with animals, severe psychological violence 
One of the most important achievements made by the women’s human rights 
movement in Turkey has been to grant more legal protection for women who might find 
themselves in situations of domestic abuse. Even though the government has been more 
vocal on this issue arguably more so than any other gender issue, the way in which laws 
and programs are implemented concerning the protection of women against domestic 
violence perfectly illustrates the tensions encountered between the government and 
feminist organizations (Meline 2011). This is further illustrative of a disconnect in 
norms and values between the EU and the Turkish government. 
 
4.1.1. Measures combating domestic violence at the national level 
 
The Law for the Protection of the Family (Law 4320) passed in 1998 only 
applied for the victim after domestic violence has already occurred, meaning no 
preventative measures existed. A problem that complicated matters even more was that 
there existed a mentality of not reporting violence, more so than today. There have been 
further reports in the inadequacies in the implementation of the law, such as the 
misunderstandings of law enforcement who for example would ask for papers 
documenting an infraction during a domestic abuse case even though the law does not 
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stipulate that documentation is required. This of course then acted as a further hindrance 
for women receiving protection from the state. Furthermore, there are several women in 
rural parts of the country who had never been registered therefore they cannot make an 
official complaint and were also not able to receive help from the state. Even though 
women were underreporting their experiences with domestic violence earlier, all these 
factors contributed to the even lower reporting of experienced domestic violence, 
signaling a disconnect between the way in which the law was interpreted and passed and 
the way it was implemented. 
The Law on Protection of the Family and the Prevention of Violence against 
Women passed in March 2012 is considered a significant victory for the women’s 
movement in which over 200 women’s organizations participated in getting passed in 
Turkey. As Park describes, 
 
…[Family and Social Policies] Minister Fatma Şahin wanted to have 
contributions from NGOs. It is, however, difficult to bypass the male-dominated 
bureaucracy. Although several changes were made despite our objections, I 
believe that we as women’s NGOs have played an important role in the adoption 
of the law. I can say that this is a success [that stems from] the strong lobbying 
activities of female lawyers and women’s associations (2011). 
 
The new law was passed by the Turkish Parliament on International Women’s Day and 
addressed many of the shortcomings of Law 4320, as the name suggests. The biggest 
accomplishment of the new law is that it is capable of protecting all women, regardless 
of their marital status and further prevented victims from suffering economically by 
giving abused women an allowance, paying for childcare, allowing the family court to 
intervene in the instance of shared property to make sure that the victim isn’t victimized 
again 
After the passing of this law along with the ratification of the Istanbul 
Convention, the government started a pilot project entitled ŞÖNİM in 14 locations to 
operate as a part of implementing this law. Each center is supposed to operate in 
providing support from law enforcement, legal aid, social work, finding a job, and 
anything from women’s NGOs. However, these this pilot programmed has been heavily 
criticized by women’s organizations who follow a feminist approach and who were 
active in promulgating the passing of the Law on Protection of the Family and 
Prevention of Violence against Women. First of all, the targeted audience for this 
program is not only for women and children, often the ones who are victims of domestic 
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violence, but also the ones who are perpetuating the violence. Furthermore, these 
centers have the ability to choose if a woman is able to stay at one of the shelters and for 
the duration of how long she can stay. However, this runs counterintuitive to the way in 
which feminist organizations such as Mor Çatı operates their shelter, as they claim that 
this program does not allow autonomy and self-empowerment to women who have 
already been victimized. These centers are meant to also work all day every day, 
however it has been noted that due to limited staff capacity, this has not yet been 
realized. Furthermore, these centers are typically located outside the city, meaning they 
have very little outreach and are located far from attaining the expertise they need for 
fulfill expertise on their staff. Not only that but on a practical level, this makes it very 
difficult for women who are in need and who do not have many resources to reach these 
centers. According to Park, a fear expressed by other women’s organizations can be 
summarized in the following, 
 
Independent women’s organizations have also expressed concern that these 
centers may eventually replace the feminist women consultation and solidarity 
centers, causing a loss of experience and expertise gained from years of work in 
the field of violence against women (2011) 
 
As stated earlier, tension exists between Mor Çatı and the state when it comes to 
both funding and the way in which the state manages the shelters. Most of the 
aforementioned shelters are headed by the state but according to Mor Çatı do not mesh 
well with feminist principles in the way in which the shelters are being run. The state 
shelters seem to have stricter rules and do not allow women to have their cellphones 
with them. Furthermore, the women who seek refuge at these state-run shelters are not 
allowed to leave without permission. Both these options leave women without a sense of 
autonomy after they had already been abused and being dependent on their husbands, 
meaning they are not able to learn how to (re)gain a sense of independence in the event 
that they leave the shelters. While Mor Çatı allows the women to stay up to 12 months 
as well as allows boys up to the age of 18, the state has stricter regulations and only 
allows for a 4-5 month stay. 
The above is extremely important as it lends insight as to how the state and 
feminist organizations are at odds with one another as 19 women’s organizations 
refused to work with ŞÖNİM – not only ideologically but also practically in the 
implementation of the law. The way in which the law is being implemented under this 
program does not allow for women to have access to everything offered by the law and 
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lacks a women’s-oriented approach. From the way in which this program has been 
carried out by the government suggests that the government values the family over the 
individual women by acting as an authority in controlling who can benefit from their 
services. This example is also elucidating in understanding how the government 
perceives its role as attempting to prevent divorce and to keep the family in tact by the 
sheer fact that it also allows for perpetrators to seek help. 
4.1.2 At the international level 
 
Turkey has signed and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which is an international treaty that established the European Court of Human Rights. 
Turkey is also a member of the Council of Europe, which is an organization that holds 
its member states accountable for issues related to human rights. Furthermore, Turkey 
has ratified both the CEDAW and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in 1985 and 2002 
respectively and has signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women in 2011 and 2012. As Gündüz 
states, 
 
…This convention (CEDAW) demands the realization of the same rights for 
men and women in all fields of life with changes and revisions of law in areas 
that discriminate against women and the taking of necessary measures for the 
modification of daily activities and practices that perpetuate discrimination. With 
the ratification of CEDAW, Turkey responded to the intensified international 
and national debates about women’s rights, which were energized by the UN 
Decade of Women. The signing was mainly due to international pressure and 
concern about the international reputation of the country. With the ratification of 
CEDAW and the demonstrations of efforts to improve women’s status, Turkey 
tried to present a positive picture, in order to justify the request for membership 
in the European community from 14 April 1987 (2004: 128). 
 
In other words, in signing these conventions and protocols that are embedded 
with norms and values that Europe holds, Turkey is expected to abide by these norms 
and values if not face repercussions from being connected with European institutions. 
Turkish citizens are able to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (as 
many have) when they feel that the judicial decision has violated values in the 
aforementioned international treaties, the following statement highlights the deficits in 
such a system: 
 
Despite the authority granted to the European Court of Human Rights, the court 
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is a distant actor at best for the actual implementation of its judgments and in its 
influence in preventing domestic violence. The effectuation of the long-term 
goals expressed by human rights activists would ultimately require the state 
government of Turkey, specifically the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of 
Justice to enact the strong enforcements against domestic violence. It would also 
require the involvement of domestic institutions to actively educate and mobilize 
its population to ensure protection for women in Turkey on an individual level 
This statement carries some weight as it is indicative that the judicial arm of a European 
institution embedded in the EU is not enough to enact change at the societal level, 
indicating that further avenues need to be pursued in order to be able to solve problems 
within the larger women’s movement. While another view holds that the decisions made 
regarding domestic violence and released by the European Court of Human Rights in 
facts holds weight and is important 
 
because this ruling publically condemned Turkey in its failures to fulfill its 
declared obligations to protect its women from domestic violence. It specifically 
condemned the shortcomings and indifference of authorities who were supposed 
to ensure protection for the victims of domestic violence. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights then acts as a mechanism to be able to 
publicly condemn Turkey. In this way, within the lens of sociological institutionalism, 
we can view this as acting as a legitimation force for the Turkey as a norm breaker to act 
in line with international norms. However, with statements made by top-level officials, 
the need for the Turkish government to seek legitimation and to fulfill international 
socialization is dubious at best. 
4.1.3 The European Commission’s 2014 Progress Report 
	  
Even though some European Commission Progress Reports in previous years 
have been overall positive, the way in which women’s issues have been handled in 
Turkey have been criticized. In the EU’s 2014 Progress Report, Turkey was criticized 
for not effectively implementing the Law on the Protection of Family and Prevention of 
Violence against Women. The Report noted that there was obvious discrepancy between 
the plan for the struggle against violence made by the Turkish Ministry for Family and 
Social Policies, citing that CSOs “regretted la lack of indicators, objectives, a 
monitoring system or funds allocated for activities. Violence Prevention Centres were 
established in 2 additional pilot cities, 14 in total. A regulation on their operation had to 
be issued, staff appointments were not completed and appointed staff not trained” (2014 
EU Progress Report 56).  
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The Report further criticized the deficiency of the government in providing the adequate 
number of shelters, lack of financial support, as well as the lack of follow-up once 
shelters were established (2014 Progress Report 56). The Council of Europe Taskforce 
recommends that there be around 72,000 shelters for women in Turkey, however at the 
time the article was written there were only around 123, meaning that Turkey did not 
fulfill 71% of the shelters that were recommended for them. On top of this, the Report 
overall called Turkey to account in not providing enough protection for both women and 
children citing honor crimes and child marriages as significant problems in the country.. 
4.1.4 Public Debate Regarding Domestic Violence 
 
Public debate regarding domestic violence has been recently enflamed by the 
example of Sefer Calinak who had been in prison for previously killing two women (one 
of which he was married to another his girlfriend) appeared on a dating show. A month 
later he appeared on another talk show hosted by Seda Sayan as she introduced him by 
saying “Have you ever seen a murdered with such a smiling face?” Experts and activists 
from different sectors chimed in to voice their opinions regarding the ostensibly 
nonchalant appearance of a murderer on a normal and popular day-time television 
program and the message that this was supposed to send the rest of the public. Head of 
the Human Rights Foundation (TİHV) Korur Fincancı argued that that by having this 
man on this show and allowing him to defend himself by putting most of the blame on 
the women who were victimized really normalizes violence in Turkey. She argued that 
this might then lead people to take justice in their own hands without going through the 
correct legal proceedings with such light sentencing in the judicial system, as was 
evidenced by this man on TV. It has been argued that this simultaneously reinforcing 
the idea that domestic violence is a personal matter, therefore the public should not get 
involved. This is easily illustrated by the dozens of cases cited in which women beaten 
in public during the day were not hindered by other people on the street – this is also 
supported by anecdotal evidence of neighbors not intervening when a husband is beating 
his wife when in most cases the neighbors don’t interfere or call the police as they 
consider this a matter that should be sorted out in the family. Furthermore, the point 
raised by activist Tehide Tagan in Al-Monitor was that while there are no serious 
deficiencies with the laws, the problem lies within the way in which the laws are 
implemented. 
	  	  48 
While the move to allow a two-time convicted murderer was condemned by a 
CHP parliamentarian however TV show host Sayan was defended by Ankara Mayor 
Melih Gökçek who is part of AKP – this has sparked a debate online and in the 
government  and among the general public as can be seen with the more than 3,000 
complaints received by the television station that aired the program. One of the major 
questions that was raised, which is also a valid question in places such as the United 
States, as to the blurring of certain images such as cigarettes or alcohol on television 
airings but not much censoring of violence against women– as the message of having a 
convicted killer on television is not quite clear – is it to make light of the situation in an 
attempt to put all the blame on the women who were victims of these crimes. Or perhaps 
some have debated that this man’s appearance might raise awareness to women that 
these things happen in Turkey and to be cautious when hearing men justify themselves 
in this way. These are the issues that people were debating as they were not sure of the 
underlying message. 
The statements and the actions made by the government even though passing 
laws that were promulgated by Europe has been revealing as to an emerging narrative in 
the political sphere. While the mentality of the government towards intervening in the 
private sphere has ironically changed in the past two decades, the Islamic conception of 
“nature” pigeon holes women into one role in society, leading the government to 
emphasize the norm of “motherhood,” which overrides the norm that women are as 
equally valuable in any role they choose to have in society. In this sense, women are 
only viewed as being part of the family unit, with the government interpreting that it is 
their moral duty to act as a conduit to fix marriages in shelters for battered women as 
opposed to helping women gain their autonomy.	  
4.2 Public Debate Regarding Abortion 
 
While the issue of abortion was never high on the political agenda in Turkey 
after it was legalized in the 1982 Constitution, it has become a contentious issue within 
after 2011. Abortion has been the talk of the town for the past couple years – The rate of 
abortion was found to be low in 2008 (unlike the world average of 28/1000 people 
Turkey is 14.8/1000 people) – in fact, abortions were legalized in 1983 precisely 
because there were too many deaths from illegal and unsafe abortions (Tremblay 2014, 
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1b). Even so, there are examples to where the rule of law regarding abortion rights has 
become more and more degraded in Turkey as women are being denied abortions.  
In March 2014, a 22-year-old women tried to kill herself after she was denied an 
abortion as a state hospital. This incident came on the heels of several controversial 
statements made by government officials as well as rumors about abortions being 
banned. This case is more or less justified or legitimized when in the summer of 2012 
high-level government officials such as the mayor of Ankara made such statements like 
“What is the baby’s crime that he deserves to get aborted? The pregnant women should 
commit suicide instead” (Tremblay 2014, 1a) or to where then-Prime Minister Erdoğan 
several times likened abortion to murder after first saying “I consider abortion to be 
murder. No one should have the right to allow this to happen” (Ahmadi 2012). The issue 
of abortion was further politicized in Turkey in 2012 when Erdoğan compared abortion 
to the massacre at Uludere in which Kurdish smugglers on the Iraq border were 
mistaken for members of the PKK. 
After these statements, Erdoğan stated that there was an initiative to place more 
restrictions on abortions in Turkey such as changing the law that said that women can 
have abortions at 10 weeks to 4 weeks, unless the woman could prove that there was 
some type of emergency (Gharib 2012). After these controversial statements were made, 
women’s organizations mobilized women on the street in a series of campaigns, such as 
“Benim Kararım” (My Decision) as well as numerous petitions. 
On March 11th 2014, there were rumors that abortion was secretly banned. In an 
interview with Al-Monitor, the head of the OB/GYN association explained it in the 
following way 
 
The right to choose to terminate a pregnancy based on the women’s decision is 
legal, but we cannot provide the service. What is left to medical doctors is either 
classifying any abortion as a medical necessity or redirecting women to seek 
private care to terminate the pregnancy. 
 
In other words, even though there has not been a ban on abortion, state hospitals 
are not allowed to give abortions and no governmental funding exists. There have then 
been claims that this will cause a rise in the price of abortions in private facilities, 
severely disadvantaging poorer women. Furthermore, this does not address the needs of 
abortion as a moral problem since there is a lot of research that shows that high 
restrictive regulations in curbing abortions does not correspond to the number of 
abortions performed or received (Tremblay 1a) 
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Human rights lawyer and renown journalist Orhan Kemal Cengiz diverted 
attention away from the Uludere incident to an abortion issue that had not previously 
existed by stating “…the prime minister wants to get conservative and religious people 
on his side, people who have been criticizing him over Uludere and other issues for 
some time.” Even if Erdoğan was simply making these shocking statements for political 
purposes, the Turkish government still have effectively been able to reframe the 
narrative regarding abortion in equating it with murder and by also making it more 
difficult for women to receive abortions under any circumstances in state hospitals. By 
the act of making it more difficult to receive one even without outright banning it has 
effectively meant that a topic as controversial as abortion is not open to the society for 
debate. 
Although the EU does not have a cohesive policy regarding abortion, in an 
interview with BBC Turkish in the summer of 2012, EU Commissioner for Enlargement 
Stefan Fule criticized the way in which the discussion of abortion was handled by 
subsuming it under freedom of expression. Civil society was not able to debate the 
subject and restrictions were implemented in public hospitals with little to no public 
consultation by saying: 
 
This is a sensitive issue. It is one of the issues that politicians should address 
extremely carefully. There is no EU regulation in this field. There is need for a 
broad debate on this matter. Not only politicians, but the civil society, doctors 
and of course most importantly women should also debate abortion. Because this 
is primarily their issue (Bal 2012) 
 
However, due to the recent restrictions imposed by the government regarding abortion, 
they seemed to have taken little to no heed of Fule’s criticisms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FEMINIST ACTIVISTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE EU IN TURKISH WOMEN’S 
NGOS 
 
 
 
Even though women’s organization in Turkey have not had an extensive history 
with most prominent women’s right-oriented organizations having started in either the 
late 90s or the early 2000s. Since this time, they witnessed the growing influence of 
globalization, increasing involvement of international institutions, advances in 
technology, as well as domestic changes. This has no doubt had an impact on the way in 
which women’s organizations in Turkey perceive their immediate environment as well 
as their transnational links with the EU. 
I will argue in this chapter that feminist organizations perceive the EU as a 
normative power as well as playing a vital role in the Turkish women’s movements. 
Furthermore, factors such as funding, networking, and professionalization has 
contributed to the way in which activists in feminist organizations perceive the EU to be 
a vital part of the women’s movement. Thus, it could be said that these organizations 
fall in a sort of “conceptual trap” in which they can see no other alternative to an 
institution such as the EU. 
5.1 Organizations interviewed 
	  
The organizations that I have interviewed for the purposes of this thesis are high-
profile women’s rights-oriented organizations that operate on feminist principles and 
have worked extensively with international institutions – in fact forming most of their 
motto, slogans, and identities from international meetings such as the Beijing 
Conferences or from international conventions such as CEDAW. I interviewed activists 
representing different aspects of areas being addressed in order to achieve greater 
gender equality. I conducted semi-structured and in-depth interviews with an activist 
from each organization. The interviewees varied among age and chosen profession and 
had different levels of experience in the women’s movement in Turkey. KA.DER 
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(Support and Training of Women Candidates) works to promote the political 
participation among women in Turkey, KAGIDER (Women Entrepreneur’s 
Association) works to promote women entrepreneurs mainly in the economic sphere, 
while Purple Roof (Mor Çatı) provides shelter and other services for those women who 
need help from domestic violence.	  
 
Table 2 Organizations Interviewed for this Thesis 
	  
Name	   Organization	   Position	   Date	  of	  Interview	  
Gönül	  Karahanoğlu	  
	  
KA.DER	   Chairperson	   13.11.2014	  
Nuray	  Özbay	  
	  
KAGIDER	   and	  
KA.DER	  
Deputy	  Secretary	  
Board	  of	  
Directors	  
14.11.2014	  
Ilke	  Gökdemir	   Purple	   Roof	  
Foundation	  
Volunteer	   18.11.2014	  
	   	   	   	  
 
 
5.1.2 KA.DER 
	  
KA.DER was founded in 1997 by nineteen working women, including Şirin Tekeli 
who has been a prominent name in the women’s movement especially since the 1980s. 
The women who founded this organization were chosen purposefully in order to include 
“journalists, businesswomen, politicians, and public relations consultants to be able to 
increase the capacity to have access to policy networks” (Bayraktar 2009: 37). This can 
be reflected in the extensive networks that KA.DER has been able to create and the 
quality of work it produces. KA.DER defines itself as an association in defending the 
equal representation of both men and women in all aspects of life, particularly in elected 
and decision-making bodies, which is vital for democracy. KA.DER’s priority lies in 
equal representation for all women in the world of politics. The main belief behind these 
aims is that problems that are faced by women in society would simply not be resolved 
without women in decision-making bodies. 
There are currently 3,000 members in KA.DER. They are advocating for a critical 
mass of at least 30% to be reached in Parliament. Their public campaigns are aimed at 
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public awareness and they have a political school as one of their most important and 
wide-reaching activities. Among their major projects that they have been carrying out 
since 2008, KA.DER has focused on educating women who are potential candidates in 
both local and general politics as well as empowering women citizens. In the realm of 
empowerment projects, KA.DER first carried out the Empowerment of Women Citizens 
Project funded by the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) in an attempt to 
further improve women’s NGO’s capacities in Turkey as well as general awareness 
raising of women’s rights (www.KA.DER.org). A similar project has been carried out 
but funded by the European Union entitled “Empowerment of Women Citizens and 
Activists as Active Voters and Citizens Project” between 2013-2015 in collaboration 
with the DIHAA. The EU funded approximately 94% of this project (146,825 Euro out 
of the 155,829 Euro in expenditures). The first phase of this project comprised of 3-day 
long seminars in not only empowering women but also raising awareness among voters 
and potential candidates about women’s rights issues. This project had wide-sweeping 
effects as it was able to reach 1,708 women spread across several cities in Turkey. 
KA.DER is transparent with all its activities as well as their funding through its reports 
that are released every two years along with the rotation of its internal staff. 
In terms of addressing the problem of low female participation in Parliament 
between 1935-2007 there have only been 186 women in parliament as opposed to 8,294 
men – in 2007 only 4.4% of Parliament was composed of women. KA.DER offers a 
women’s training facility in order to promote more women in decision-making bodies in 
which they have reached more than 20,000 women in Turkey. While KA.DER’s goal in 
1997 was to raise the number of female parliamentarians to 10%, they almost reached 
their goal in 2007 with  9.1% female parliamentarians. During the time preceding the 
2007 elections, KA.DER had nationwide campaigns that are seen as playing a role in 
this increase (Bayraktar 2009: 36) 
5.1.3 KAGIDER 
	  
KAGIDER is a non-profit organization founded in Istanbul in 2002 by 38 women 
entrepreneurs. As their name would suggest, KAGIDER aims to elevate the status of 
women both economically and socially by enhancing entrepreneurial skills in order to 
be able to achieve their stated vision which is “creating a world in which women 
produce and establish their existence freely and plan an effective role in decision 
making processes” (KAGIDER.org). Among some of its main activities are projects, 
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mentorship support, training programs, consultancy services as well as advocacy and 
lobbying work. KAGIDER not only supports Turkey’s getting into the EU but also 
argues for the role of women in the negotiation process. Because KAGIDER is also 
involved in the EU dialogue and in maintaining this dialogue, they have been the first 
women’s organization to set up an office in Brussels, which allows them to 
communicate more easily with both the EC and EP. 
KAGIDER presents an interesting case simply because it is not as reliant on EU 
funding as the other two organizations as it has even established its own fund to help 
smaller organizations benefit from funding, as these organization does not normally 
have the capacity to benefit from EU funding. 
5.1.4 Mor Çatı (Purple Roof) 
	  
Purple Roof was founded in 1990 after it was realized that a solidarity network 
that was created out the need that so many women needed support from doctors and 
lawyers against domestic violence. Purple Roof assumes that violence comes from the 
inequality that exists in society between men and women, therefore it’s important for 
Purple Roof to empower women’s solidarity as well as building women’s confidence 
and gaining their autonomy to make their own decisions. 
Purple Roof has a Solidarity Center open for women who have experienced 
some form of domestic violence. The Center on average receives ten applications 
everyday either by phone or in person (www.morcati.org). Purple Roof also runs a 
shelter in collaboration with the Şişli Municipality and the European Commission 
Delegation of Turkey among others who support Purple Roof. 
 
 
Table 3 EU Funding Received by Feminist Organizations Interviewed in this Thesis 
Name	   of	  
Organization	  
Name	   of	   Project	   and	  
Year	  
Type	  of	  Funding	   Amount	  
KA.DER	   Empowerment	   of	  
Women	   Activists	   and	  
Women	   Citizens	   as	  
Voters	   and	   Active	  
Citizens	  2013-­‐2015	  
EIDHR	   146,	  825	   (out	  of	  155,	  
825)	  
Purple	  Roof	   Building	   Bridges	   for	  
Prevention	   of	  
Violence	   Against	  
Women;	  2010-­‐2011	  
EIDHR	   139,	  992	   (out	  of	  101,	  
981)	  
Purple	  Roof	   Women’s	   EIDHR	   120,000	   (out	   of	   148,	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Collaboration	   for	  
Gender	   Justice	   2012-­‐
2013	  
236)	  
KAGIDER	   Avrupa	   Kadın	  
Girişimcileri	   Mentor	  
Ağı	  2011-­‐2013	  
EC	   ??	  
KAGIDER	   Kars’taki	   Kızlar	  
İleriyor	  2010-­‐2011	  
EU	   and	   Turkish	  
government	  
??	  
KAGIDER	   WE-­‐Mentor	   Projesi,	  
2007-­‐2008	  
?	   ??	  
Source: Data gathered from official websites of KA.DER, KAGIDER, and Mor Çatı. 
 
 
 
5.2 Perception of the EU as a “reference” point for terminology 
 
Since the concept of governance in allowing more stakeholders to become 
involved in the policy and decision making processes has became a global phenomenon, 
civil society has been booming as a result. Unfortunately due to the reasons stated 
above, in a developing country such as Turkey, the concepts of civil society and 
nongovernmental organizations were not part of the normal lexicon. In much this way, 
as the EU had made a decision in the 1999 White Paper on governance that every 
decision and endeavor made by the EU would be in the name of governance, therefore 
strongly supported the emergence of civil society.  This support of civil society was not 
only limited to member states, as Gönül Karahanoğlu, the current Chairwoman of 
KA.DER pointed out the importance that the EU played in being the formation of the 
concept “NGO” and “civil society” for not only Turkey at large but specifically Turkish 
feminist organizations when asked about the contribution of the EU to the women’s 
movement, “They (NGOs) have been able to build their expertise on certain issues. 
There is now a mentality of NGO. These are the two main issues”2 
 
5.3 Perception of EU as a reference point for best practice 
 
A plethora of good and best practices exist within Europe, which makes the scene even 
more complicated for the most efficient way of carrying out project or a specific 
program. Any organization would need guidance in order to recognize the best practice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 KA.DER Interview with Gönül Karahanoğlu 13/11/2014. 
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and to be implement it as Ilke Gökdemir from Purple Roof described that Europe is 
often the site of best practice for the way in which shelters are run according to a 
feminist approach.3 
 
So for example when you say that child care is a must, you are using the best 
examples from the EU. So it’s also a reference at the legal level – at many levels. 
It’s a resource of best practice. And at the same time, it’s the solidarity among the 
women’s organizations around Europe – it’s also another thing that is very crucial.” 
 
5.4 EU as Agent of Institutionalization 
 
One of the limitations for organizations during the 90s in Turkey was simply a 
lack of institutionalization and lack of professionalization Before being associated with 
KA.DER, Karahanoğlu had been working on social projects with NGOs since 1994. 
When first speaking about the EU, she brought up the first social project that she took 
on in the mid-90s entitled Aile Danişma Merkezi, which was a joint project between the 
Kadıköy Municipality, Marmaray University and a women’s platform. According to 
Karahanoğlu, “we didn’t know how to start, because it was a social project. We 
envisioned some things and after five years, I realized that all the goals I had written on 
a piece of paper were accomplished.”4She then explains that there was not much 
direction regarding how to plan, run, and implement social projects in Turkey at that 
time. Furthermore, this project mainly focused on to provide already-existing social 
provisions to women in poor neighborhoods in the district of Kadıköy. In her interview, 
Karahanoğlu indicated that these projects were focused on “helping” people that 
provided support educationally, socially, legally, physically, and mentally. This project 
did not only focus on women but also included children. Karahanoğlu further goes onto 
detail a project started in 2002 called the Sançayaşam project, which marked the first 
joint project between a Turkish municipality (Kadıköy Municipality) in which 
workshops and seminars were given to police officers and imams regarding gender 
issues. She said that before that experience, she did not know how to write a proposal 
for projects but learned during that period.5She perceives that the project was successful 
and credits the EU in providing expertise or know-how in two ways. The members of 
the EU project were able to teach the staffers on how to write for projects as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Purple Roof. Interview with Ilke Gökdemir 18/11/2014	  
4 KA.DER Interview with Gönül Karahanoğlu 13/11/2014. 
5 KA.DER Interview with Gönül Karahanoğlu 13/11/2014.	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providing extra staff to take care of bureaucratic details that allowed the other staffers to 
work in achieving the immediate goals of the project. 
But then when referring to the further institutionalization of feminist organizations, 
we find that all the interviews agree that through the process of applying for funding and 
for projects, this actually forces the organizations to become more and more organized 
and self-monitoring: 
 
The EU has contributed mostly on the institutionalization of women’s organizations 
– monitoring the issues – they also pushed the Turkish NGOs to monitor themselves 
even in projects, in policies, in activities, we got an understanding of those impact 
analysis on all our activities. This is mostly in line with EU project applications, 
financial support – that sphere gave the Turkish women’s movement a chance to 
learn to institutionally strengthen ourselves and have a better staff capacity and have 
a better accountability – even keeping the basic accounts and stuff. It gave a certain 
kind of knowledge and know-how on that. Also the notion of solidarity with the 
other women’s organizations in Turkey and around Europe with communicative 
channels for projects.6 
 
 
5.5 Networking with other European Organizations 
 
The EU-funded projects that NGOs often apply to and get accepted sometimes 
have a dimension of twinning the project with another organization. This works well on 
several fronts. This allows for the subject and goals of the project for the one applying 
further interaction with a program that is either trying to accomplish the same goal – 
therefore you have more brain power and double the manpower in carrying out the 
project or you can become paired with an organization that has already proved good or 
best practices. With this opportunity, Ilke Gökdemir states: 
 
So with these EU projects, we get acquainted with women from other countries 
and we become aware of what they have in their countries – and we take these 
things as our goals. And then we work in that direction. There are a lot of 
exchanges of thoughts that I think is very positive.7 
 
Furthermore, Nuray Özbay discussed the KAGIDER’s office that they have in 
Brussels, which allows them not only to have representation in Europe but also allows 
them to be closer to civil society groups in Europe such as the EWL which acts as an 
important locus for lobbying and advocating. For women’s organizations in Turkey that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Nuray Özbay. Former Assistant Secretary KAGIDER and on the Board of Directors at KA.DER 
7	  Ilke Gökdemir. Purple Roof. 18.11.2014 
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want to have an international outreach, the EU is seen as one of the most important way 
to accomplish that goal. International outreach could mean networking with other 
women’s organizations in order to attempt collaborating with one another 
 
…most of the women’s organizations have their own linkages with European 
channels like the European Delegation in Turkey or the Parliament or the 
European Women’s Lobby so you can bypass state politics and all those 
negativities there so you can directly get connected with the EU process via the 
NGO-EU channel 8 
	  
 
5.6 Ambiguity regarding the future of the EU 
	  
After the 2014 EP Elections revealed the emergence of Euro-skeptic and conservative 
parties whose rhetoric is not similar to the European standard of norms. This Euro-
skeptic rhetoric is less likely to hurt women’s issues rather than help it. This leads 
certain activists who benefit from EU funding not sure about the future of the EU 
considering the rising anti-EU sentiment: 
 
There is one more thing within the EU itself. The gender issues – they are not 
very prioritized – the financial crisis, the economic problems, austerity measures 
and problems provide cuts from the budgets of women’s issues. So it’s another 
battle on the EU level – keeping the gender issue on the agenda of the Parliament 
because the EU itself turning a more conservative tide – so its another big 
discussion. So if it’s going to be like this, perhaps the gender priority of the EU 
will decline. And we will have a huge impact. Currently, I don’t see a progress 
there. I think it’s harder to get the Parliament, to push the Commissioners 
because there are discriminatory discussions in the Parliament like on the LGBT 
rights, so as the right wing policy and conservative politics is increasing in the 
EU. 
 
5.7 Perception regarding the exclusitivity and limitations of the EU 
 
During these interviews, while discussing the extent to which the EU is inclusive 
for women’s organizations in Turkey fighting for women’s rights, there was unanimous 
agreement among all participants that processes in gaining funding from EU institutions 
was laborious and could be improved, because as they stand now, applying for funding 
is such a tedious process that only certain organizations with already-existing capacity 
are able to successfully receive funding as the competition is fierce. Furthermore, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nuray Özbay. Former Assistant Secretary KAGIDER and on the Board of Directors at KA.DER	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then puts newer and smaller women’s organizations that are not already well-equipped 
at a disadvantage in not being able to receive funding, since there is very limited 
funding they would be able to receive otherwise. 
However, while all women interviewed were in agreement with the benefits of 
funding providing by the EU, each expressed a grievance related to the funding, Scholar 
Asuman Keysan reflects an argument found in the literature in regard to the increase of 
funding as “not an uncontroversial issue for women’s groups in Turkey. The dominance 
of the projects has been on of their crucial discussion topic” (2012:1) The argument then 
generally follows that while there are more organizations that have become increasingly 
professionalized, this “project-based activism” has taken away from the “spirit of the 
women’s movement” and have caused fragmentation within the movement. 
Furthermore, all interviewees were in agreement that there is a serious problem 
with solidarity among women’s organizations here in that women’s organization can 
and do not work with one another on a long term basis – they will only work with one 
another when there is a certain cause that is brought to the agenda, normally by 
politicians. This poses problems when one considers long-term goals and long-term 
projects that are needed in implementing measures that are supposed to be sustainable. 
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CONCLUSION 
	  
	  
	  
 
This thesis began by delineating a series of hypotheses regarding the way in 
which women’s rights-oriented feminist organizations perceive the EU within the larger 
women’s movement in Turkey. I first hypothesized that feminist organizations perceive 
the EU as a normative power. Throughout the reading of both the history of the 
women’s movement and major developments in Turkey-EU relations, it is quite clear 
that the EU pressurized the Turkish government by using diplomatic censure and praise 
to further promulgate certain norms and values found within the European community. 
By both being able to look at the actions and motivations of the government, such as the 
signing of CEDAW and the reversal in the decision to criminalize adultery, we can 
clearly see examples in which the Turkish government was pressured by the EU in the 
early 2000s to conform to certain norms. This can be understood as common discourse 
among major feminists activists as interviewed in this thesis in their understanding of 
the history of this aspect of the women’s movement in Turkey. 
The women’s movement was started during the latter part of the Ottoman 
Empire and that was granted greater freedom in the pursuit of democratization in the 
early years of the Republic was largely stalled until the late 80s when domestic violence 
became an issue for debate in the public. Civil society blossomed in Turkey after the 
1999 earthquake with the realization that the Turkish government could not provide 
basic services that the people needed. Economic and political liberalization in the 80s 
and 90s coincided with a rising civil society in Turkey. When Turkey was admitted as a 
candidate for member of the EU in the 1999 Helsinki Summit and a roadmap was 
created, the Turkish government began feeling pressure to conform to EU norms and 
standards. Therefore, the EU was able to apply pressure through both Progress Reports 
and Member Accession documents in order to change the Civil Code and the 
Constitution and signing international agreements on gender equality, making the 
Turkish government was more receptive to these changes. This in turned empowered 
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women’s, and in particular feminist, organizations in Turkey by paving the way to begin 
advocating and lobbying on women’s issues in society. 
The negotiation process that was started in 2005 made it easier for these 
organizations to work with the government, who was at that time open to including civil 
society into the policy making process. However, perception among feminist 
organizations is that they cannot cooperate easily with the Turkish government as the 
incumbent party has started to promote ideals that correspond with more religious 
conservative values that run counterintuitive to the values promulgated by the EU not 
only in the area of women’s rights but also human rights at large. 
If we are to turn to our theoretical framework, we would find that the women’s 
organizations were in a position to open themselves to the international stage due to 
both globalization and the transformations that Turkey was going through with political 
and economic liberalization in the 80s and 90s. However, grassroots organizations at 
that time had limited access to the government in changing policy. While after the 1999 
Helsinki Summit which propelled Turkey to candidate status provided a roadmap for 
Turkey to follow. These changes represented a shift in gender policy as well as new 
rhetoric that opened the stage for lobbying and advocacy. On top of this, the increased 
importance placed on civil society dialogue and project by the EU provided several 
opportunities for feminist organization in Turkey to be able to carry out projects that 
would influence policy in Turkey. 
By embarking on a discussion involving international socialization and the role 
that the EU has played in an attempt to diffuse its international norms through political 
conditionality for member states, we can begin to understand the environment in which 
Turkey found itself at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 2000s. 
Through the process of what has been termed “international socialization,” the 
government of Turkey was in the early 2000s attempting to become a part of a larger 
political community. As the European Union had relatively more legitimacy in the eyes 
of the Turkish public during those years when Turkey was accepted as a candidate to 
become member of the EU, according to sociological institutionalism, the way in which 
both the coalition government and the AKP conducted and pushed legal reforms through 
Parliament with a seemingly more open approach to working with civil society and 
particularly women’s organizations as “norm leaders,” we can explain this as an attempt 
to be a part of the larger European Union and to attempt to seek legitimization in the 
eyes of the larger international community. 
	  	  62 
By examining public discourse surrounding highly controversial women’s issues 
in contemporary Turkey, such as domestic violence and abortion, we can more clearly 
understand the way in which the government has been able to shape the narrative and 
environment in which feminist organizations operate in. When it comes to domestic 
violence, the example of one government program that offers help to both victim and 
offender in domestic violence, clashes between government and feminist organizations 
in their mentality become obvious in simply approaching the subject of domestic 
violence. Furthermore, by delving into the newly debated issue of abortion as top-level 
politicians made recent statements that have galvanized women’s organizations 
spanning the ideological spectrum, the government still made regulations despite 
objections from civil society. In this environment of hostile rhetoric, conflicting 
mentalities little to no public consultation has contributed to a perception of being 
dependent on the EU as well as seeing the EU as an increasingly necessary part of the 
women’s movement not as a legitimizing role but in strengthening ties not influenced by 
politics.  
With Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s announcement in January 2015 of the 
“Program on the Protection of Family and Dynamic Population Structure,” he proposes 
to provide increasingly incremental financial incentive measures for mothers and each 
subsequent child they have (“Mothers welcome…” Daily Sabah). Further incentives for 
working women after their maternity leave include flexibility in the numbers of hours 
worked per week depending on the number of children the woman has or the age of the 
child. These new incentives suggests a discourse that deemphasize women in the public 
sphere, signaling a shift from the discourse in the early 2000s (“Turkish gov’t 
unveils…” Hürriyet Daily News).  
During the interviews, it was clear that this perception of the EU as having been 
and will be a necessary part of the women’s movement but not as a pressurizing force. 
Instead, over the years with the completion of projects, opportunity to network and be 
represented in Brussels, among others have become more important than simply acting 
as a legitimizing tool. Furthermore, feminist organizations themselves have become 
much more effective at pushing pressure on the government once they become more 
professional and institutionalized. One of the ways they have become more 
institutionalized is through applying to projects funded by international institutions. 
Instead of seeing this in simply a rational choice way, these funds allowed them to carry 
out projects that promoted their values and ideas. Applying to these funds also required 
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quite a load of work, therefore these organizations were required to increase their 
capacity and know-how and expertise in order to write projects for funding. As has been 
stated by several activists in the women’s movement in Turkey, these projects further 
pushed institutionalization of these organizations but also networking experiences and 
professionalization. Furthermore, with feminist organizations like KAGIDER able to 
have a presence in Brussels and to have a presence in the EWL, they have been able to 
utilize EU mechanisms in furthering the voice of women in Turkey and airing 
grievances that are commonly experienced by the women in Turkey. So in other words, 
organizations like this don’t simply have symbolic representation in Europe simply by 
having an office there, but it also works for lobbying and advocacy work, which has 
increased their international legitimacy. 
While the women interviewed did not seem to be fazed by the status of Turkey-
EU relations, I would argue that this has an impact on their work when put into the 
sociological framework. While it is true that horizontal and vertical linkages have been 
established and maintained by women’s organizations in Turkey, the EU no longer has 
leveraging or bargaining power when it comes to commenting on the status of human 
rights within Turkey if looking at discourse from top-level officials. The premier of the 
country has stated that he does not believe in the legitimacy of the European Parliament 
decision as well as EU Commission Progress Reports that both at times made statements 
criticizing Turkey on its human rights violations. This has received quite severe push 
back from officials in Turkey that really do not do more than heighten tensions between 
the two. 
Considering the limits and scope of this thesis, there are several prospects for 
future research. While this thesis narrowed in on the perceptions of feminist 
organizations, there is certainly room to further research other ideologies found in 
women’s organizations as they might not be as receptive to a supranational institution 
such as the EU. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to research smaller women’s 
organizations with lesser visibility in Turkish society that might not have the capacity to 
apply for EU funding. 
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